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BY ALEXANDRAHOLMSTROM-SMITH*
Abstract. The COVID-19 pandemic has thrown the global surrogacy industry into chaos,
stranding surrogates, infants, and their caretakers across the world from the intended
parents. As surrogates and staff are left caring for infants that are strangers to them by law,
the emotional toll of commercial surrogacy is more visible than ever before. In this article, I
argue that this moment is ripe for reconsidering our laissez faire approach to for-profit
reproduction. When the Baby M case hit the news in 1988, it set off a chorus of alarm
among feminists (and others). Many states subsequently passed laws banning commercial
surrogacy. Yet in the years since then, the dominant feminist position has quietly shifted.
Surrogacy is now seen as a choice, one that expands women’s possibilities both as workers
and as mothers. Surrogacy is also seen as an LGBT rights issue, as it provides a way for gay
men to have children that are genetically related to them. However, the issues of gender,
race, and exploitation that inflamed feminists in the 1980s and 1990s are no less relevant
today. As renewed concern with economic justice has made a resurgence on the national
stage, I argue that it is time for socialist-feminist perspectives on surrogacy to reemerge.
Eschewing freedom of contract as an illusory freedom that serves the ruling class, such a
politics would demand social policy that limits commodification and promotes reproductive
justice and freedom for all, not just the wealthy few.
* The author would like to extend her deepest thanks to Professor Ruthann Robson for her valuable help with this paper,
which was developed in her Sexuality & the Law seminar. The author would also like to thank her mother, Nancy Holmstrom,
for her editing and suggestions.
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When Sierra Martin signed up to be a gestational surrogate for a gay couple from China, she
had no inkling of the havoc that COVID-19 would bring. One week before her due date, she learned
that the couple would be unable to travel to the United States to pick up the baby due to travel
restrictions. The couple asked her if she could take the baby home and care for him until they were
able to travel. Martin didn’t know what to do, but eventually, she agreed. Spending months on end in
lockdown with the baby was emotional.
It will be hard to give him back, because I’ll miss him . . . But I know he’s not
mine, and that I have to give him up, which is totally OK with me . . . But there’s
definitely a bit of attachment there . . . I care for him. When you love on a baby,
you love on a baby.1
This situation is unusual but Martin’s emotional attachment is unsurprising. Indeed, because
the surrogacy industry seeks to avoid the possibility of bonding, it is rare, “unprecedented,” for a
surrogate to care for the baby after birth.2
The COVID-19 pandemic has exposed many grossly unequal and exploitative features of
our society that were previously easier to ignore, including the surrogacy industry and its workers.
From U.S. surrogates and staff members stuck “holding the baby,” to the Israeli couple stuck in New
Jersey with their new infant unable to fly home, to the dozens of surrogates, nurses and newborns
holed up in a hotel in Ukraine while borders closed, COVID has thrown the global surrogacy
industry into chaos.3 Although by no means the most important problem that COVID has exposed,
it’s still worth pausing to examine a global industry worth billions of dollars4 which has a vested
interest in making sure that love does not form between a pregnant person and the child they gestate.
This places a burden upon workers like Martin, which philosopher Elizabeth Anderson calls the
emotional labor of surrogacy: the conscious effort to not bond with a child.5




3 Id.; Mary Ilyushina, Dozens of surrogacy babies stranded by coronavirus lockdown in Ukraine, lawmaker says, CNN (May
16, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/15/europe/ukraine-surrogacy-babies-lockdown-intl/index.html [https://perma.cc
/MPL9-W753]; Daniela Prugger & Oksana Parafeniuk, Surrogacy Is Complicated—Then Add a Global Pandemic, Mᴀʀɪᴇ Cʟᴀɪʀᴇ
(May 17, 2020), https://www.marieclaire.com/health-fitness/a32433196/surrogacy-covid-19-ukraine/ [https://perma.cc/B6
NY-7W58].
4 As of 2015, the industry was worth over one billion dollars in India alone. Arielle Pardes, How Commercial Surrogacy
Became A Massive International Business, VICE (Jan. 13, 2016), https://www.vice.com/en/article/exq7nz/how-commercial-
surrogacy-became-a-massive-international-business [https://perma.cc/8H9W-4QPE].
5 Elizabeth Anderson, Is Women’s Labor a Commodity?, 19 Pʜɪʟ. & Pᴜʙ. Aғғ. 71, 82 (1990). Here she is using the
term “emotional labor” in the sense originally proposed by Arlie Hochschild in Tʜᴇ Mᴀɴᴀɢᴇᴅ Hᴇᴀʀᴛ (1979), in which a
worker has to manage her own emotions in order to produce a particular emotional experience in another person (usually a
customer). But see Julie Beck, The Concept Creep of ‘Emotional Labor,’ Tʜᴇ Aᴛʟᴀɴᴛɪᴄ (Nov. 26, 2018), https://www.theatlan
tic.com/family/archive/2018/11/arlie-hochschild-housework-isnt-emotional-labor/576637/ [https://perma.cc/RYB5-Q5UE]
(explaining that the term “emotional labor” has been become blurry as it has been used to apply to a wider range of
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,
24 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 3 (2021)
446
Approximately 1,000 babies are born to surrogates in the U.S. every year, and “media
coverage of births via surrogacy is more positive than ever before.”67 Yet in the 1980s and 1990s,
surrogacy generated a great deal of concern in feminist discourse. In this article, I will discuss how
mainstream American feminism has changed its position on commercial surrogacy and invite readers
to re-reconsider the issue. Starting with the feminist response to In re Baby M, I chart how feminist
discourse shifted from seeing surrogacy as a form of exploitation to seeing it as a personal choice.
As an activist with a labor rights background, this neoliberal discourse of personal free
choice is very familiar and deeply misleading. Surrogacy is a contract, and contracts are often used to
restrict workers’ legal and substantive freedoms. To understand why workers sign them anyway, we
have to look at the imbalance in bargaining power between workers and employers. Using this lens of
true social and economic justice enables us to ask what individual freedom really means in the context
of the workplace. Is freedom the ability to alienate things from ourselves in exchange for money, or is
freedom the ability to live a good life with material security, without exchange? Addressing the bodily
workplace specifically, I turn to Marxist feminist scholarship on labor and commodification to
explore what it means for individuals and society when human reproduction is for sale. In doing so, I
address the comparison between surrogacy and sex work, outlining how state interventions into each
have had very different consequences for workers.
Moving beyond the theoretical dimensions of class and gender, I question what surrogacy
means in the context of white supremacy and imperialism. Revisiting Black feminist scholarship from
the 1990s, I will discuss the analysis of commercial surrogacy as reinscribing a white, patriarchal,
heteronormative, neo-eugenicist, unjust notion of family. Despite many changes in the market since
the 1990s, including the expansion of commercial surrogacy to the Global South, I find that much of
this analysis still holds.
Finally, I outline a practical, feminist, anti-capitalist politics of surrogacy. I argue that its
foundational demand must be the right for surrogates to back out of the contracts and keep the baby,
if they choose. Next, I address how altruistic surrogacy might play a role in a just and equitable future.
I then sketch a reproductive justice policy platform which would truly expand reproductive freedoms
for all people, not just the wealthy. I conclude that commercial surrogacy is irreconcilable with such
reproductive justice.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF FEMINIST VIEWS ON SURROGACY
A. From surrogacy as exploitation to surrogacy as choice
When surrogacy first came to public attention in the United States, the feminist
response was near-universal extreme concern. Feminists including Betty Friedan, Gloria Steinem,
Gena Corea, Barbara Katz-Rothman, Evelyn Fox Keller, Janice Raymond, Mary Daly, and Phylis
Chesler wrote as amici curiae in In re Baby M, opposing surrogacy and supporting Mary Beth
experiences).
6 Kim Armour, An Overview of Surrogacy Around the World: Trends, Questions and Ethical Issues, 16 Nᴜʀsɪɴɢ ғᴏʀ
Wᴏᴍᴇɴ’s Hᴇᴀʟᴛʜ 231, 233 (2012), https://www.growingfamilies.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Overview-of-Surogacy-
Around-The-World.pdf [https://perma.cc/L2RZ-2EUW] (last visited Apr. 8, 2021).
7 NEWYORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, REVISITING SURROGATE PARENTING:




Whitehead-Gould’s right to keep her child.8 Feminist commentators including Katha Pollitt9 decried
the practice, while feminist philosophers Elizabeth Anderson, Mary Gibson and Christine T. Sistare
wrote articles opposing the legalization of commercial surrogacy.10 During this period,
[f]eminists and women’s groups were united against the trial level decision of Baby
M and similarly united in support of the New York State legislation banning
surrogacy. The New York Women’s Bar Association and the New York chapter of
the National Organization for Women lobbied actively for the passage of the law
and the bill itself was sponsored by Helene Weinstein, a pro-choice Brooklyn
Democrat.11
Writers, scholars, and activists such as Angela Davis, Dorothy Roberts, and Anita L. Allen
contributed to a rich discourse on the ways that commercial surrogacy echoed the United States’
tradition of racially stratified reproductive labor and could exacerbate racial inequalities.
As time went on, however, a new consensus on surrogacy began to emerge among
American feminists.12 The neoliberal ideology that dominated in the late 1990s and 2000 influenced
this consensus.13 Surrogacy and reproductive technology came to be viewed as expanding women’s
options, both to become mothers and to become surrogates. Moving away from a framing of
exploitation, feminists repositioned the decision to become a surrogate as a free choice. Deborah
Machalow’s argument for legalizing commercial surrogacy in New York State is typical of this
“choice” discourse. She writes:
[T]he ability to enter contracts, including surrogacy agreements, is included in the
meaning of personal autonomy . . . Enforcing surrogacy agreements strengthens
self-determination and personal autonomy, as enforcement “presupposes that the
woman’s body is hers and hers alone unless she consents to some particular use of
8 Brief for The Foundation on Economic Trends et al. as Amici Curiae, Matter of Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1232
(N.J. 1988).
9 Katha Pollitt, The Strange Case of Baby M, Tʜᴇ Nᴀᴛɪᴏɴ (May 23, 1987), https://www.thenation.com/
article/archive/strange-case-baby-m/ [https://perma.cc/85EB-YMMX].
10 See Anderson, supra note 5 (arguing surrogacy constitutes an unconscionable commodification of women’s
reproductive capacities); Mary Gibson, Contract Motherhood: Social Practice in Social Context, 3 WOMEN & CRIM. JUST. 55, 59, 84-85
(1992) (arguing commercial surrogacy cannot be adequately regulated to protect the interests of both recipient and contract
mothers); Christine T. Sistare, Reproductive Freedom and Women’s Freedom: Surrogacy and Autonomy, in LIVING WITH
CONTRADICTIONS: CONTROVERSIES IN FEMINIST SOCIAL ETHICS 395 (Alison M. Jaggar ed., 1994).
11 Elizabeth S. Scott, Surrogacy and the Politics of Commodification, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 119 (2009)
(describing how diverse groups organized in opposition to surrogacy legalization following the Baby M decision).
12 Commercial surrogacy is illegal in many countries around the world, including much of Europe and Asia.
Feminist views may be different in those countries, a topic which unfortunately is outside the scope of this paper. Lennlee
Keep, Surrogacy Facts and Myths: How Much Do You Know?, PBS: INDEPENDENT LENS (Oct. 22, 2019), https://
www.pbs.org/independentlens/blog/surrogacy-facts-and-myths-how-much-do-you-know/ [https://perma.cc/XL52-C3WL].
13 See Courtney Joslin, (Not) Just Surrogacy, 109 CAL. L. REV. 1 (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 54-56)
(https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3561081) (noting that feminist groups, over time, took less of a
position against surrogacy due to complex feelings towards the practice). See also generally, DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY
OFNEOLIBERALISM (2007).
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it.” “The argument that a woman cannot knowingly and intelligently agree to
gestate and deliver a baby for intending parents carries overtones of the reasoning
that for centuries prevented women from attaining equal economic rights and
professional status under the law.” . . . .14
Other early authors in this discourse included Carmel Shalev and Lori Andrews.15 According
to Shalev, “the refusal to acknowledge the legal validity of surrogacy agreements implies that women
are not competent, by virtue of their biological sex, to act as rational, moral agents regarding their
reproductive activity.”16 Instead, she calls for laws that “recognize the constitutional privacy of
individuals, regardless of gender, to define legal parenthood as a matter of autonomous decision-
making authority, before conception.”17
In addition, surrogacy could be seen as increasing the choices available to women who
would like to acquire a child through surrogacy. Christine Kerian argues that “[s]urrogacy extends the
ability to procreate to persons who may not otherwise be able to have children, thereby enhancing
individual freedom and the right to make choices.”18 This discourse of individual reproductive choice
has also been elevated through the language of international human rights. A study by the Cornell
Law School International Human Rights Policy Advocacy Clinic concluded that “legalizing surrogacy
would be consistent with the [international human rights] treaties’ stated goals by protecting intended
parents’ right to found a family and a woman’s right to reproductive autonomy.”19 Sital Kalantry
writes:
When a woman chooses to support a couple or individual by serving as a
gestational surrogate (where she is not genetically connected to the child because
she did not contribute her egg), I believe she must have the autonomy to do so – provided
she is protected by the law to ensure that any power imbalance between her, on the
one hand, and the intended parents, surrogacy agencies and doctors, on the other
hand, is mitigated.20
14 Deborah Machalow, Note, Legislating Labors of Love: Revisiting Commercial Surrogacy in New York, 90 Iɴᴅ. L.J. 1,
18–19 (2014).
15 LORI B. ANDREWS, Surrogate Motherhood: The Challenge for Feminists, 16 LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 72 (1998)
(arguing that the surrogacy is a viable alternative reproductive method for couples struggling with infertility and should be
protected as an important choice); CARMEL SHALEV, BIRTH POWER: THE CASE FOR SURROGACY (1991) (arguing that the law
must treat surrogates as autonomous parties to a binding contract rather than reinforce paternalistic attitudes and deny women
legal autonomy).
16 SHALEV, supra note 15, at 11.
17 Id.
18 Christine L. Kerian, Surrogacy: A Last Resort Alternative for Infertile Women or A Commodification of Women’s Bodies
and Children?, 12 Wɪs. Wᴏᴍᴇɴ’s L.J. 113, 115 (1997).
19 SITALKALANTRY ET AL., SHOULD COMPENSATED SURROGACY BE PERMITTED OR PROHIBITED? 33 (Cornell
L. Sch. Int’l Hum. Rts. Pol’y Advoc. Clinic and Nat’l L. U., Delhi eds., 2017).






Even where inequality is acknowledged, feminist thinkers still see the choice to become a surrogate as
worthy of protection.
As neoliberal feminism consolidated its position, the new consensus held that feminist
concerns about surrogacy are “outdated.” As an indicator of this consensus, the Women’s Bar
Association of New York State issued a position statement in favor of a bill to legalize commercial
surrogacy in 2018.21 Framing having children that are genetically related to one as a “need,” the
Association chastised the New York State legislature for failing to “evolve” in response to advances
in reproductive technology.22 Acknowledging the legacy of Baby M, the Association provided two
solutions to the hypothetical problem that surrogates may develop emotional attachments to the
child. First, the Association noted that “traditional” surrogacy, in which the surrogate uses her own
ova, is today “frowned upon in both the legal and medical communities.”23 This position is based on
an implicit assumption that surrogates will not form an attachment to a baby that is not genetically
related to them. Second, the Association asserts that “professionals involved in surrogacy
arrangements impose strict screening procedures to ensure that anyone seeking to act as a gestational
carrier has the emotional and financial stability to ensure success.”24 What the Association does not
state is the normative claim underlying its assumptions: that pregnant persons ought not to feel an
emotional bond with children who are genetically unrelated to them. Nor does the Association
acknowledge the harm that will be caused by contract enforcement in those circumstances in which
“screening” inevitably fails to predict how every person will feel about the child she is gestating
during a pregnancy.25 Even more surprisingly for a women’s organization, it fails to even mention
that gestational surrogacy – involving embryo implantation – is more physically invasive for
surrogates and has worse health outcomes for her and the child(ren) than a natural pregnancy.26 In
21 Position Statement, Women’s Bar Ass’n of N.Y., Child-Parent Security Act (2018),
https://www.wbasny.org/legislation/2018-a-6959-a-s-17-a/ [https://perma.cc/2TH8-VZEP] (last visited Apr. 6, 2021).
22 “While the law in most states has evolved to keep pace with these medical advances, that is not the case in
New York and the consequences for New Yorkers are profound.” Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Several writers on this topic have cited the statistic that over 99% of surrogates willingly relinquished the child
and less than one-tenth of one percent of agreements resulted in court battles. See KALANTRY, supra note 20, at 21; Elly Teman,
The Social Construction of Surrogacy Research: An Anthropological Critique of the Psychosocial Scholarship on Surrogate Motherhood, 67 Sᴏᴄ.
Sᴄɪ. & Mᴇᴅ. 1104, 1104 (2008). However, the strongly biased source of the statistic about court battles is a spokesperson for
the Organization of Parents Through Surrogacy (OPTS), a support group for intended parents. See Judy Keen, Surrogate Relishes
Unique Role, USA TODAY (Jan. 22, 2007), https://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/health/2007-01-22-surrogate-role_x.htm
[https://perma.cc/WQL5-WEQS]. In contrast, neutral studies documenting the prevalence and outcomes of surrogacy in the
U.S. are scarce. Any such studies of course do not address the number of surrogates who either do not have access to courts or
who are aware that the law is against them, and therefore do not pursue claims to keep the children they gestate. Ethnographic
studies of surrogacy in India have shown that emotional distress at relinquishing the children is a part of the experience of at
least some surrogates. See SHARMILA RUDRAPPA, DISCOUNTED LIFE: THE PRICE OF GLOBAL SURROGACY IN INDIA 60-61
(2015); AMRITA PANDE, WOMBS IN LABOR: TRANSNATIONAL COMMERCIAL SURROGACY IN INDIA 148 (2014). The existence
of cases in which US surrogates have sought custody of the children they gestated also demonstrate that this does happen,
however infrequently. See for example Cook v. Harding, 190 F. Supp. 3d 921 (C.D. Cal. 2016), aff’d, 879 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir.
2018); In re Baby, 447 S.W.3d 807 (Tenn. 2014); In re F.T.R., 833 N.W.2d 634 (Wis. 2013); P.M. v. T.B., 907 N.W.2d 522 (Iowa
2018), 139 S. Ct. 125 (2018); In re C.K.G., 173 S.W.3d 714 (Tenn. 2005); J.F. v. D.B., 879 N.E.2d 740 (Ohio 2007).
26 Christina Caron, Surrogacy Is Complicated. Just Ask New York, N.Y. Tɪᴍᴇs (Apr. 18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.
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this way, a highly sanitized image of commercial surrogacy is presented, in which surrogates
successfully disassociate their emotions from their bodies and in which their bodies do not suffer
pain, stress, or exploitation.
The consensus has shifted so far that feminist groups have raised little protest even when
U.S. states have allowed contracts to significantly curtail surrogates’ bodily autonomy. For example,
Oklahoma, Delaware, Illinois, and Nevada have regulatory schemes that specifically allow for contract
clauses requiring surrogates to undergo all medical examinations, treatments and fetal monitoring
procedures recommended by their treating physician.27 Other states, including Arkansas, California,
Connecticut, Iowa, New Jersey, and North Dakota, have left it up to the courts to decide whether
contract clauses that restrict surrogate’s medical decision making during pregnancy will be enforced.28
Research indicates that these clauses are found in contracts in at least some of these states.29 Such
contracts may even require a surrogate to undergo an unwanted abortion.30 This issue finally received
some national attention in recent years when a California surrogate faced legal damages for refusing
to have an abortion requested by the intended parent.31 Delaware, Illinois, and Nevada statutes
provide that a surrogate may only choose her physician after consultation with the intended parents.32
Many states also allow contract clauses that intrude into the surrogate’s daily life, including what
foods she can eat, what hair products she can use, whether she can exercise or receive acupuncture,
and more.33 These might seem like excessive intrusions into women’s personal lives, yet “public and
scholarly engagement with the details of these schemes has all but disappeared.”34 Courtney Joslin’s
meticulous research into legislative histories has shown that when Illinois and California implemented
their statutory schemes, both of which contained some of the problematic aspects discussed above,
there was literally no recorded opposition, and not a single legislator voted against them.35
The only way to make political sense of why these laws have been ignored by major feminist
organizations is that neoliberal feminism’s focus has always been on the needs and interests of white,
upper class women, rather than the class of women as a whole. Permissive surrogacy regimes
promote the interests of wealthy white women who either cannot be pregnant themselves, or choose
not to, but nonetheless want children who are genetically related to them or their male partners, and
whose gestation they can monitor and supervise. Even where surrogacy does not involve a genetic
com/2020/04/18/parenting/pregnancy/surrogacy-laws-new-york.html [https://perma.cc/99M5-U6K3].
27 See OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 557.6 (2019); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-807 (2013); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/25
(2005); NEV. REV. STAT. § 126.750 (2013).
28 Joslin, supra note 13, at 34-35 (noting the lack of a statutory scheme).
29 Hillary L. Berk, The Legalization of Emotion: Managing Risk by Managing Feelings in Contracts for Surrogate Labor, 49
L. & SOC’Y REV. 143, 156-57 (2015).
30 See, e.g., Cook, 190 F. Supp. 3d at 929 (“C.M.’s attorney informed Cook in writing that, by refusing to [terminate
one of the pregnancies], she was in breach of the contract and liable for money damages thereunder.”). In these cases a
surrogate who refuses an abortion may have to pay contract damages but courts will not order specific performance.
31 Michelle Goldberg, Is A Surrogate a Mother?, Sʟᴀᴛᴇ (Feb. 15, 2016), http://www.slate.com/articles/double_x
/doublex/2016/02/custody_case_over_triplets_in_california_raises_questions_about_surrogacy.html
[https://perma.cc/XT68-XMZZ]. The case discussed is Cook v. Harding, 190 F. Supp. 3d 921.
32 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-807(c)(3); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/25(c)(3); NEV. REV. STAT. § 126.750(4)(c).
33 Berk, supra note 29, at 156-57; Joslin, supra note 13, at 32-37.
34 Id. at 49.




connection between the intended parents and the child, some wealthy would-be parents find the
consumer-oriented experience of surrogacy preferable to adoption procedures. For example, as a
caller into an NPR show explained her feelings:
My daughter is adopted, and my son was with a surrogate, and it just felt much
more like . . . concrete with my son, because like, I knew that my daughter’s
mother could choose to mother her, choose to parent. Whereas the surrogate I was
working with I knew was going to surrender my son to me . . . partly because we
paid her money.36
Fertility companies also offer a shopping-like experience with regard to genetic material. As one
company advertises,
People from around the world are secure in knowing that our egg donors are
indeed derived from remarkable, accomplished young women. Our Donors range
in age from 20-29 to maximize the quality of eggs produced. . . . Many intended
parents find they want their egg donor have [sic] similar ethnic traits including eye
color, height, etc. We understand this need. . . .37
Surrogacy agencies may also go to great lengths to accommodate the scheduling needs of
would-be parents.38 Thus, would-be parents may also feel that surrogacy offers a more predictable
timeline compared to adoption. In this way, convenience for the would-be parent/consumer is
maximized. As will be discussed later, commercial surrogacy also gained popular acceptance as many
wealthy celebrities publicly embraced it in their own families.
The reproductive interests of a minority of upper-class straight couples dovetailed well with
the reproductive interests of upper-class gay men. Surrogacy allows gay men to have children that are
genetically related to one member of a couple, and some gay male advocates are in favor of making
surrogacy more widely available.39 However, the embrace of surrogacy as an matter of LGBT justice
requires further explanation. After all, “[l]esbians are more likely to be surrogates than enter into a
surrogacy contract as intending parents.”40 Yet expanding surrogacy has been quite uncritically
36 New Bill to Legalize (and Limit) Gestational Surrogacy, Tʜᴇ Bʀɪᴀɴ Lᴇʜʀᴇʀ Sʜᴏᴡ, WNYC, at 26:00 (Feb. 17, 2020)
(on file with author).
37 Orm Fertility, Donor Program, https://ormfertility.com/egg-donor-program/ [https://perma.cc/P88T-TGVJ]
(last visited April 20, 2021).
38 Medically unnecessary cesarian sections have been ubiquitous at some clinics in India, in large part to
accommodate the scheduling needs of international clients. PANDE, supra note 25, at 117.
39 For example, Men Having Babies, an organization that provides educational and financial support to gay men
who want to become parents through surrogacy, joined other LGBTQ groups in endorsing the “Child-Parent Security Act” to
legalize surrogacy in New York State. See Letter from various LGBTQ+ organizations, to Speaker Heastie, Majority Leader
Stewart-Cousins, and Members of the New York State Legislature (May 23, 2019), https://www.familyequality.org/wp-
content/uploads/2020/04/LGBTQLETTERCPSAFINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/SZ5V-H4TS]; MEN HAVING BABIES,
https://www.menhavingbabies.org/ [https://perma.cc/KN59-F7CV] (last visited Apr. 27, 2021).
40 Laura Briggs, Legal Surrogacy Bill has Major Drawbacks, Tɪᴍᴇs Uɴɪᴏɴ (June 10, 2019), https://www.timesunion.
com/opinion/article/Commentary-Legal-surrogacy-bill-has-major-13966494.php [https://perma.cc/LC8X-XXMA].
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embraced by the mainstream of the LGBT rights movement. For example, in New York, an extensive
coalition of LGBT rights nonprofits, from Lambda Legal to the Trevor Project, endorsed a bill to
legalize commercial surrogacy in the state,41 despite objection from older feminists and women’s
health advocates.42 As one commentator stated, “This bill may benefit some gay men and a
smattering of trans people, usually white and wealthy — but not LGBT people as a group.”43
It would appear then that “a gay elite has hijacked queer struggle and positioned their desires
as everyone’s needs.”44 In recent years, a revitalization of radical queer activism has rejected the
mainstream LGBT rights movement’s focus on marriage equality and access to the military. Instead,
these queer activists have rallied in support of immigrant rights, anti-racism, and an expanded welfare
state, positioned in opposition to marriage, assimilation, U.S. militarism, police, and prisons.45
However this revitalized radical queer politics has yet to deeply engage in the discussion around
surrogacy.
Third-wave feminism and the movement for sex workers’ rights have also contributed to the
new feminist consensus. Feminists rejected the notion that women who worked in industries, such as
sex work and surrogacy, that required enacting stereotypically sexist or gendered roles suffered from a
kind of false consciousness. Instead, women may rationally choose to enact such roles because they
may enjoy playing such roles on terms that they set, and/or because they can gain income by doing
so.46 I take this perspective to be true, to the extent that it describes the choices of many, or perhaps
most, women workers in these industries. However, some completely reject earlier concerns about
the type of work that women do, as such concerns are seen as moralizing and paternalistic.47 While
41 Coalition, Facing the Future Together: Breaking Down Barriers for TLGBQI New Yorkers (2019), https://equalityny
.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/TLGBQIAdvocacyDayPolicyPriorities2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/9P2U-62RH] (last
visited Apr. 20, 2021).
42 See Briggs, supra note 40 (discussing how surrogacy contracts may lead to exploitation and diminish the rights
of surrogates); Judy Norsigan et al., Removal of Surrogacy Legislation (S.2071) from the Governor’s Budget, Oᴜʀ Bᴏᴅɪᴇs Oᴜʀsᴇʟᴠᴇs
website, (Feb. 20, 2020), https://www.ourbodiesourselves.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/OBOS-Surrogacy-Memo-2-20-
20.pdf [https://perma.cc/7ADU-WLFQ]; See Vivian Wang, Surrogate Pregnancy Battle Pits Progressives Against Feminists, N.Y.
Tɪᴍᴇs (June 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/12/nyregion/surrogate-pregnancy-law-ny.html [https://perma.cc
/NT3P-TRY7] (discussing how surrogacy contracts may lead to exploitation and diminish the rights of surrogates).
43 Briggs, supra note 40.
44 Interview with Mattilda Bernstein Sycamore, A ‘Queer’ Argument Against Marriage, NPR (June 10, 2010),
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=127740436 [https://perma.cc/RX68-N7RK].
45 See e.g., the success of the 2019 Queer Liberation March in New York City. Reclaim Pride Coalition, History
Statement, https://reclaimpridenyc.org/history-statement [https://perma.cc/56XM-DTNM] (last visited May 14, 2020).
46 See e.g., Magpie Corvid, Marxism for Whores, Sᴀʟᴠᴀɢᴇ (Aug. 1, 2015), https://salvage.zone/in-print/marxism-
for-whores/ [https://perma.cc/B7QM-EPE9] (discussing the reasons the author entered sex work); Melissa Gira Grant, Let’s
Call Sex Work What It Is: Work, Tʜᴇ Nᴀᴛɪᴏɴ (Mar. 5, 2014), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/lets-call-sex-work-
what-it-work/ [perma] (discussing financial security and other motivations for pursuing sex work); Mirielle Miller-Young,
Pornography Can Be Empowering to Women Onscreen, N.Y. Tɪᴍᴇs (June 10, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com
/roomfordebate/2012/11/11/does-pornography-deserve-its-bad-rap/pornography-can-be-empowering-to-women-on-screen
[https://perma.cc/SXK6-HB4F] (discussing pornography as a form of empowerment); Open Society Foundation,
Understanding Sex Work in an Open Society (Apr. 2019), https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/explainers/understanding-sex-
work-open-society [https://perma.cc/2NDN-KEPV] (last visited Apr. 20, 2021) (discussing sex work as the most appealing
option for most people who choose to do it).




affirming the choices and dignity of individual workers, this analysis provides few tools for cultural
critique of different industries and how they perpetuate sexist, racist, and classist ideologies. Nor are
labor rights best advanced by inattention to the intensity of exploitation in different industries, and its
nature and specificity.48 As I argue in this paper, a better socialist-feminist politics would also be
concerned about the type of world that we are building through our collective labor.
The globalization of the surrogacy industry has also played an interesting role in the
development of feminist perspectives with regard to surrogacy. Poor conditions and apparent
exploitation in the surrogacy industry in India and other parts of the developing world have garnered
a fair amount of press attention.49 While some feminists took up this issue, others charged them with
patronizing savior attitudes towards women in the Global South.50 This would be in keeping with a
pattern in which “Western feminists have [historically] constructed third-world women as poor,
illiterate, culturally oppressed, and in need of rescue.”51 The critics may have a point, as Joslin’s
research has shown how public concern for surrogate’s welfare abroad was not matched by
engagement with or concern for the welfare of surrogates at home.52 Capital’s ability to shift its
location with relative ease also led some observers to conclude that bans were impractical.53
Finally, opposing commercial surrogacy brings together strange bedfellows. Surrogacy (along
with all IVF) is opposed by the Catholic Church, while anti-gay movements have shaped regulation of
commercial surrogacy in India and Israel, where access to surrogacy has specifically been denied to
gay intended parents.54 The anti-surrogacy positions of certain vocally transphobic radical feminists55
of sympathy for commercial surrogates); as applied to sex work see Peter Frase, The Problem with (Sex) Work, Pᴇᴛᴇʀғʀᴀsᴇ.ᴄᴏᴍ
(Mar. 27, 2012), http://www.peterfrase.com/2012/03/the-problem-with-sex-work/ [https://perma.cc/2A2P-PKYW]
(discussing the moralizing nature of some arguments related to sex work); see also Corvid, supra note 46 (discussing how sex
work is just another type of work).
48 See Alexandra Holmstrom-Smith, A Radical New Politics of Surrogacy? Nᴇᴡ Pᴏʟɪᴛɪᴄs (Winter 2020) (discussing
surrogacy as a form of work); Nivedita Majumdar, Love, Labor & Capital, 3 Cᴀᴛᴀʟʏsᴛ Issue 3 (Fall 2019), https://catalyst-
journal.com/2019/12/labor-love-and-capital https://perma.cc/GVX7-4XAD] (last visited Apr. 20, 2021) (discussing
surrogacy in the context of labor rights).
49 RUDRAPPA, supra note 25, at 1-2.
50 Lewis, supra note 47, at 56 (describing anti-surrogacy feminists as motivated by “neoimperialist humanitarian
feminism”). One of the groups Lewis discusses critically is FINRRAGE, the “Feminist International Network of Resistance to
Reproductive and Genetic Engineering,” which describes itself as an “international network of feminists who are concerned
with the development of reproductive and genetic technologies and their effects on women.” See id. at 54; FINRRAGE,
http://www.finrrage.org/ [https://perma.cc/YV2F-YEGQ] (last visited May 10, 2021).
51 Alison Bailey, Reconceiving Surrogacy: Toward a Reproductive Justice Account of Surrogacy Work in India, 26 HYPATIA
715, 717 (2011).
52 Joslin, supra note 13, at 53. On the other hand, even taking into consideration the serious problems with US
surrogacy that Joslin highlights, labor conditions for surrogates in the global south are likely worse overall, and thus more
worthy of concern.
53 PANDE, supra note 25, at 172-74; Lewis, supra note 47, at 4.
54 John M. Haas, Begotten Not Made, U.S. CONF. CATH. BISHOPS (1998), https://www.usccb.org
/committees/pro-life-activities/begotten-not-made-catholic-view-reproductive-technology [https://perma.cc/FB7Z-L44P]
(last visited April 8, 2021); Aniruddha Ghosal, The New Surrogacy Bill Won’t Let Live-in and LGBTQ Couples Become Parents,
NEWS18 (Dec. 20, 2018), https://www.news18.com/news/india/the-new-surrogacy-bill-wont-let-live-in-and-lgbtq-couples-
become-parents-1979055.html [https://perma.cc/693C-LGPL] (last visited Apr. 8, 2021); Netael Bandel, Lee Yaron &
Jonathan Lis, Israel’s High Court Rules Against Surrogacy Law Excluding Single Men and Gay Couples, HAARETZ (Feb. 28, 2020),
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have also likely soured this issue’s appeal for many younger feminists.56
Commercial gestational surrogacy is explicitly legalized in twenty states,57 and the trend
strongly favors legalization.58 Some states have no laws governing surrogacy at all, but outright bans
are now present in a very small minority of states.59 Recent laws legalizing commercial surrogacy have
passed in New Jersey, Washington, New Hampshire, Nevada, and the District of Columbia.60 New
York joined them in April 2020.61
II. INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY CLAIMS OFTEN SERVE CAPITALIST INTERESTS,
ESPECIALLY IN THE SPHERE OF ECONOMIC REGULATION
When feminists argue that becoming a surrogate is a choice, they echo the classic liberal
tradition that valorizes individuals’ choices without deeply considering the context in which they are
made. This discourse leaves out the important question of what other options are available to the
person making such a choice, and it ignores the balance of power between the parties entering into an
agreement such as a surrogacy contract. Legal theory and lawyering in the tradition of economic and
social justice has a very different approach to contracts from the liberal approach I have outlined
above. In this section, I will outline the economic and social justice approach to contracts in general. I
will then show how these perspectives apply to surrogacy.
Contrary to liberal discourse, labor law is premised on the idea that there is an inequality of
bargaining power between workers and employers. The preamble to the NLRA outlines its purpose
to address “[t]he inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full freedom
of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are organized in the corporate or other
forms of ownership association. . . .”62 Collective bargaining provides one avenue for addressing this
systematic power imbalance. However, even with unions, employers will almost always try to get the
most favorable contract terms for themselves.
In non-union sectors, unfair terms in employment contracts are a much bigger problem.
Around 60 million American workers have signed employment contracts with mandatory arbitration
https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-israel-s-high-court-rules-against-surrogacy-law-excluding-single-men-and-
gay-couples-1.8596231 [https://perma.cc/H7AN-4WQY] (last visited Apr. 8, 2021).
55 See, e.g., Janice Raymond, author of both THE TRANSSEXUAL EMPIRE (1979) and WOMEN AS WOMBS:
REPROD. TECH. AND THE BATTLEOVERWOMEN’S FREEDOM (1993).
56 See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 47.
57 See Joslin, supra note 13, at 69-72.
58 See Peter Nicolas, Straddling the Columbia: A Constitutional Law Professor’s Musings on Circumventing Washington State’s
Criminal Prohibition on Compensated Surrogacy, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1235, 1288 (2014) (“Since 1993, only one state has enacted a law
prohibiting or criminalizing any aspect of surrogacy.”)
59 See Joslin, supra note 13, at 69-72.
60 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:17-60-68 (West 2018); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.26A.700-785 (2019).; N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 168-B:1-21 (2014); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 126.500-810 (2013); D.C. CODE § 16-404 (2017).
61 David Crary, No longer an outlier: New York ends commercial surrogacy ban, ABC NEWS (Feb. 14, 2021),
https://abcnews.go.com/Health/wireStory/longer-outlier-york-ends-commercial-surrogacy-ban-75888960 [https://perma.cc
/252T-XLP7] (last visited Apr. 28, 2021). See also N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT LAW §§ 581-101-704 (McKinney 2021); N.Y. GEN. BUS.
LAW §§ 1400-1404 (McKinney 2021).




clauses, barring them from access to the courts for employment-related claims.63 Recent litigation
such as Epic Systems Corporation vs. Lewis has continually expanded the power of employers to limit
employee rights through contract.64 The widespread abuse of non-compete clauses is another
example of how employers use contracts to limit their workers’ freedom, or indeed their very ability
to make a living except through working for that employer.65
This pattern is found perhaps even more egregiously in consumer law. From credit cards to
predatory mortgages to usurious payday loans, low-income consumers are often the targets of grossly
unfair schemes perpetrated through contracts.66 These practices can have consequences far beyond
the individual consumers, as it was adjustable-rate mortgages – a particularly unfair type of contract –
that were instrumental in crashing the global economy in 2007.67
To counteract these trends, lawyers working for economic justice will typically argue that
unfair contracts should not be enforced. They may use the doctrine of unconscionability, which
provides a way for judges to decline to enforce contracts that are unusually unfair and one-sided. The
Uniform Commercial Code § 2-302 states,
If the court as a matter of law finds the contractor any clause of the contract to
have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce
the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the
unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable
clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.68
“Unconscionability has generally been recognized to include an absence of meaningful
choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably
favorable to the other party.”69 Courts may look at factors such as unequal bargaining power, unfair
surprise, lack of notice, language barriers, whether a contract was one of adhesion, and other
factors.70 However, unconscionability is generally considered a high burden to prove.71 After a period
63 Alexander J.S. Colvin, The Growing Use of Mandatory Arbitration, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Sept. 27, 2017),
https://files.epi.org/pdf/135056.pdf [https://perma.cc/3MG6-QLRB] (last visited Apr. 8, 2021).
64 Epic Systems v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018) (holding that mandatory arbitration clauses in employment
agreements must be enforced).
65 Conor Dougherty, How Noncompete Clauses Keep Workers Locked In, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/13/business/noncompete-clauses.html [https://perma.cc/WJ8B-VY69] (last visited
April 19, 2021).
66 See Emily Bazelon, How Payday Loans Prey Upon the Poor—and the Courts Don’t Help, N.Y. Tɪᴍᴇs (Apr. 18, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/20/magazine/how-payday-lenders-prey-upon-the-poor-and-the-courts-dont-help.html
[https://perma.cc/5LYC-EPEG] (last visited Apr. 28, 2021); Jeff Guo, How your junk mail shows if you’re rich or poor, WASH. POST
(Oct. 19, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/10/19/how-your-junk-mail-shows-if-youre-rich-
or-poor/ [https://perma.cc/6A2U-3XA3] (last visited Apr. 28, 2021).
67 Ed Leefeldt, A Villain of the Housing Crash Makes a Comeback, CBS NEWS (June 21, 2017),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/adjustable-rate-mortgages-make-a-comeback/ [https://perma.cc/VW9Z-YKFU] (last
visited Apr. 28, 2021).
68 U.C.C. § 2-302 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2012).
69 Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
70 See, e.g., Homeland Energy Sols., LLC v. Retterath, 938 N.W.2d 664 (Iowa 2020), reh’g denied, (Feb. 26, 2020)
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of popularity in the 1960s, courts have more often turned to legislators to address grossly usurious
practices in the low-income credit market through specific regulations.72
In keeping with this concern for the fairness of a contract, an argument can be made that
surrogacy contracts suffer from problems of informed consent that make them particularly unfair.
Because surrogacy contracts typically require a person to waive their parental rights to a child prior to
becoming pregnant with that child, they require a person to make a decision when they do not have
full information about that choice. A pregnant person’s feelings toward the choice to become a
parent can change during the course of a pregnancy. This is illustrated quite clearly by the steady
number of cases in which surrogates have sought parental rights, despite previously having renounced
them.73
Even after she began to want the child, [Anna] Johnson said that she was ‘in a state
of denial’ and she kept ‘trying to tell myself that I am not supposed to have any
emotion toward my child, but there is no way that you can prevent those emotions
from taking over, and those instincts came out naturally.’74
Without knowing how she will feel during a later stage of a pregnancy, the would-be
surrogate is asked to make a choice without full knowledge of what may be at stake for her. This
makes surrogacy contracts particularly unfair and arguably unconscionable. However, this unique
aspect of surrogacy contracts has not stopped many American courts from upholding them.
Relatedly, lawyers representing working class clients may argue that contract enforcement is
against public policy. The public policy doctrine is interesting because it allows an inquiry into policy
objectives and areas of law aside from contract.75 Essentially, it allows the courts to consider what is
best for society. For example, concern for the environment might be a reason that certain contracts
(“When analyzing unconscionability claims, courts consider the factors of assent, unfair surprise, notice, disparity of bargaining
power, and substantive unfairness.”); Lenz v. FSC Sec. Corp., 414 P.3d 1262 (Mont. 2018) (“Preprinted, standard-form
consumer contracts are typically contracts of adhesion for purposes of the equitable doctrine of unconscionability, which may
render an otherwise validly formed contract or term unenforceable if the contract or term is a contract of adhesion.”); Carrillo
v. ROICOM USA, LLC, 486 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1070 (W.D. Tex. 2020) (“Carrillo’s inability to read the English-language
Acknowledgement Form, the ROICOM Representative’s misrepresentation as to the Acknowledgement Form’s contents, and
ROICOM’s failure to provide Carrillo with a copy of the Arbitration Agreement in Spanish or English, all support the
conclusion that the Arbitration Agreement was procedurally unconscionable.”).
71 See, e.g., Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., 353 P.3d 741, 749 (Cal. 2015) (“A party cannot avoid a contractual
obligation merely by complaining that the deal, in retrospect, was unfair or a bad bargain. Not all one-sided contract provisions
are unconscionable; hence the various intensifiers in our formulations: “overly harsh,” “unduly oppressive,” “unreasonably
favorable. . . . An evaluation of unconscionability is highly dependent on context.”).
72 Anne Fleming, The Rise and Fall of Unconscionability as the “Law of the Poor,” 102 Gᴇᴏ. L. J. 1383, 1391 (2014).
73 See supra note 25 (collecting cases).
74 Anita L. Allen, The Black Surrogate Mother, 8 HᴀƦᴠ. BʟᴀᴄᴋLᴇᴛᴛᴇƦ J. 17, 21 (1991).
75 See 17A AM. JUR. 2D CONT. § 231 (2021) (internal citations omitted) (“In general, parties are free to contract as
they see fit, provided that the contract does not impose obligations that are contrary to public policy. However, a contract or
contractual provision that violates public policy is invalid, unenforceable, void, and without legal effect, to the extent of the
conflict. Thus, parties may not privately contract to contravene a state’s public policy or to circumvent or disregard a statutory




should not be enforced on the basis of public policy.76 Likewise, very broad exculpatory clauses are
typically seen as against public policy,77 and of course contracts for illegal purposes will also not be
enforced.78
Public policy was the doctrine used to invalidate a surrogacy contract in the infamous Baby
M case in 1988. Although the case is over 20 years old, the issues that the court considered are no less
relevant today. In Baby M, the court explained its public policy objections as, “[t]he contract’s basic
premise, that the natural parents can decide in advance of birth which one is to have custody of the
child, bears no relationship to the settled law that the child’s best interests shall determine custody.”79
Furthermore, “[t]he surrogacy contract guarantees permanent separation of the child from one of its
natural parents. [The court’s] policy, however, has long been that to the extent possible, children
should remain with and be brought up by both of their natural parents.”80 The court found that the
contract also violated the public policy of the state in that it did not accord equal rights to both
natural parents. Instead, “[t]he whole purpose and effect of the surrogacy contract was to give the
father the exclusive right to the child by destroying the rights of the mother.”81 Like legally prohibited
adoption for pay, commercial surrogacy is ripe for abusive, coercive situations. Contrasting these, the
court found “the essential evil is the same, taking advantage of a woman’s circumstances (the
unwanted pregnancy or the need for money) in order to take away her child, the difference being one
of degree.”82 Although Baby M involved a “traditional” surrogacy agreement, gestational surrogacy
also entails courts upholding concepts of family based on genetics and fathers’ rights that are arguably
against the public policy goals of anti-eugenics and gender equality. Furthermore, public policy is
implicated in the question of whether we, as a society, think that employing individuals to do this
particularly dangerous, invasive form of labor is something that our society wants to promote through
the courts.
Finally, lawyers advocating for working class clients will generally argue that their clients
have not waived a specific right, and/or that the right in question is not waivable by contract. In
employment, an example would be minimum wage. Despite many employers’ attempts to use
contract terms as a defense to statutory minimum wage or overtime protections, courts have
consistently found that the right to receive minimum wage and overtime are not waivable by
contract.83 Likewise in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, employees and the NLRB argued that the NLRA,
76 See, e.g., SI Venture Holdings, LLC v. Catlin Specialty Ins., 118 F. Supp. 3d 548, 550 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (noting an
argument by a company that paid for legally-required environmental cleanup that a clause in its insurance contract requiring it
to obtain the insurer’s prior consent before expending funds for such cleanups was void as against public policy because it
“impede[d] compliance with environmental regulations. . . . to the public’s detriment.”)
77 See generally 8 SAMUELWILLISTON& RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 11:8 (4th
ed. 1993) (discussing court disfavor towards exculpatory clauses).
78 17A AM. JUR. 2D CONT. § 290 (2021) (“No court will lend its assistance in any way toward carrying out or
enforcing the terms of a contract or transaction that is illegal or whose purpose is to violate the law.”)
79 Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1246.
80 Id. at 1246-47.
81 Id. at 1247.
82 Id. at 1249.
83 “This Court’s decisions interpreting the FLSA have frequently emphasized the nonwaivable nature of an
individual employee’s right to a minimum wage and to overtime pay under the Act. Thus, we have held that FLSA rights
cannot be abridged by contract or otherwise waived because this would ‘nullify the purposes’ of the statute and thwart the
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which gives workers’ the right to engage in concerted activities to address workplace issues, makes
class and collective action waivers illegal.84 Similarly, consumer plaintiffs argued that the Credit Repair
Organization Act (CROA) prohibited waivers of any rights under the Act.85 This is analogous to the
New Jersey Supreme Court’s holding in Baby M that Mary-Beth Whitehead’s parental rights were not
waivable by contract, which reinstated her as a legal parent of the child. In this way, opposing the
waiver of parental rights for all gestators can be part of a broad agenda to limit corporations’ ability to
use contract as a tool of oppression.
As shown here, limiting the false “choices” for workers to sign away their rights and to be
exploited has always been a necessary part of allowing workers to have substantive freedoms and to
live a better life. It is only when one does not have the “freedom” to work for less than minimum
wage, when one does not have the “freedom” to work in unsafe conditions, and when one does not
have the “freedom” to sell one’s body parts, that a person is able to enjoy the substantive freedoms of
dignity, health, and free time. Using civil law to limit or prohibit surrogacy is consistent with this
approach.
Of course, there are always individual workers, consumers, and tenants who disagree with
this approach. Instead of believing that their interests are tied with the collective, some workers have
fought for their rights to be free of protective regulation. Mark Janus, for example, successfully
convinced the Supreme Court that his freedom of speech was impermissibly constrained by an
Illinois law that authorized unions to charge agency fees from non-members like Janus.86 When the
California legislature passed a bill requiring that rideshare companies like Uber and Lyft treat their
drivers as employees with all attendant rights and benefits, a significant portion of drivers supported
the companies’ repeal bill, Proposition 22, because they believed that being independent contractors
was more in their interests.87
Creating a more economically just society has always required implementing policies that
may not please every individual. We therefore must be skeptical of pedestalizing individual liberties,
especially when it comes to economic regulations. Social theory can help illuminate which rights and
freedoms, or “rights” and “freedoms,” should actually be championed in the interests of advancing
social and economic justice.
III. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES
A. Marxism & free labor
To ground our perspective in economic justice, we must start from the foundational
theorists who have written on capitalism. The writings of Karl Marx have been influential in
legislative policies it was designed to effectuate.” Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 740 (1981)
(citing Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 707 (1945)).
84 Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1622 (2018).
85 See CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95 (2012). That the US. Supreme Court disagreed in both of
these cases does not change that this is a common type of legal argument advanced by working-class plaintiffs.
86 Janus v. Am. Fed’n. of State, Cty, and Mun. Employees, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2456 (2018).
87 Ryan Mills, Uber, Lyft Drivers Worry California’s Prop 22 Would Cost Them Their Side Gigs, MSN (Oct. 30, 2020),
https://www.msn.com/en-us/foodanddrink/foodnews/uber-lyft-drivers-worry-california-e2-80-99s-prop-22-would-cost-




understanding capitalism from a workers’ rights perspective for over 200 years.
One of Marx’s major interventions was to show how so-called “free labor” is not actually
free. Because workers do not have capital and do not own the means of production, they cannot
produce their own means of subsistence without working for a boss. They must sell their labor power
as a commodity in the market. Although they can move from job to job, they can never get free from
this exploitative relationship because they must sell their labor to someone. In this way,
the worker, whose only source of income is the sale of [her] labour-power, cannot
leave the whole class of buyers, i.e., the capitalist class, unless [s]he gives up [her]
own existence. [S]he does not belong to this or that capitalist, but to the capitalist
class; and it is for [her] to find [her] man – i.e., to find a buyer in this capitalist
class.88
In this way, all “choices” that workers make to work in one position or another have to be
seen as essentially unfree, because the worker does not have the option to work for herself, or to not
work at all. Although there is no doubting that having the ability to move from one employer to
another is preferable to being tied to a single employer or to the land, as medieval serfs were, this
limited “choice” should never be mistaken for freedom. Because of this, the struggle must be to
change the fundamental power structure that forces workers to sell their labor in the first place.
B. Marxism & alienation/estrangement
Marx’s theory of alienation or estrangement is also highly relevant to thinking about
surrogacy. In Marx’s terms, labor (both mental and physical) is an important aspect of what makes us
human. Not all labor is drudgery in this formulation. According to Marx, the activity setting oneself a
goal, to make something, for example, and then achieving it, is inherently rewarding. Thus
“overcoming of obstacles is in itself a liberating activity . . . “ and labor becomes an act of “self-
realization.”89 However, under capitalism, the worker does not have ownership or control over the
means and product of labor, hence this deeply human activity becomes alienated, or estranged.
Because workers are not the owners of the means of production, they are not free to
determine what to produce or how to do it. They have no control over what
products they make nor over the process by which they make them, except in the
same sense that a machine has control over the process.90
Thus, Marx and Engels famously argued that capitalism turns workers into a mere
88 KARL MARX, WAGE LABOUR AND CAPITAL (1847), reprinted in MARXISTS.ORG 1, 9 (Zodiac et al. eds.),
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf/wage-labour-capital.pdf [https://perma.cc/AQ3H-WDSZ]
(last visited Apr. 27, 2021).
89 KARL MARX, GRUNDRISSE: FOUNDATIONS OF THE CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 611 (Maritn
Nicolaus trans., Penguin Books 1973) (1858).
90 Nancy Holmstrom, Alienation, Freedom, and Human Nature 5 (date unknown) (unpublished article) (on file
with author).
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“appendage of a machine,”91 as the factory worker must accommodate her body and her life to the
needs of the machine she operates. Meanwhile the worker experiences a psychological dissociation
from her own labor, as this does not belong to her either. 92
However, because labor cannot be fully separated from the human person, there is
something of ourselves that go into products that we make. Marx writes, “The worker puts [her] life
into the object; but now [her] life no longer belongs to [her] but to the object . . . It means that the
life which [she] has conferred on the object confronts [her] as something hostile and alien.”93 When
the fruits of our labor belong to another, labor stops being an expression of our human creativity and
desires, and instead becomes a coercive task. Waged work is something that we have to do, and doing
it costs us physically and emotionally, while we reserve our humanity for the ever smaller amounts of
time we have outside of work.94
A necessary correlate of alienation is exploitation. Because capitalists own the means of
production (capital, machinery, land, resources), workers cannot simply produce their own means of
subsistence. Instead, workers have to sell their labor to capitalists.95 Throughout their working day,
workers produce a stream of commodities, the sale of which would provide many times what the
worker needs to live. Yet according to Marx, capitalists only pay workers wages that are roughly
equivalent to their subsistence needs.96 “By selling [her] labour to the capitalist, the worker obtains a
right only to the price of labour, not to the product of this labour, nor to the value which [her] labour has
added to it.”97 The difference between what the worker produces and what the capitalist pays them is
what Marx calls “surplus value,” or capitalist profits.98 In this way, the worker ends up working far
more than they would need to if they owned the means of production themselves, and the extra time
that they work for the capitalist is “the forced appropriation of the unpaid labor of workers. Under
this definition, all working-class people are exploited.”99 Because the worker doesn’t own the product
91 KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, THE MANIFESTO OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY (1848), reprinted in
MARXISTS.ORG 1, 18, https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf/Manifesto.pdf [https://perma.cc/
W2N5-T7GS] (last visited Apr. 27, 2021).
92 “[“[T]he external character of labor for the worker appears in the fact that it is not his own, but someone
else’s, that it does not belong to him, that in it he belongs, not to himself, but to another.” KARLMARX, ESTRANGED LABOR,
Eᴄᴏɴᴏᴍɪᴄ ᴀɴᴅ Pʜɪʟᴏsᴏᴘʜɪᴄᴀʟ Mᴀɴᴜsᴄʀɪᴘᴛs ᴏғ 1844 (1932), reprinted in MARXISTS.ORG 1, 30,
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf/Economic-Philosophic-Manuscripts-1844.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GGG7-HJEF] (last visited Apr. 27, 2021) [hereinafter Estranged Labor].
93 Id. at 29.
94 “[T]he fact that labor is external to the worker, i.e., it does not belong to [her] intrinsic nature; that in [her]
work, therefore, [s]he does not affirm [her]self but denies [her]self, does not feel content but unhappy, does not develop freely
[her] physical and mental energy but mortifies [her] body and ruins her] mind. The worker therefore only feels [her]self outside
[her] work, and in [her] work feels outside [her]self. [Sh]e feels at home when [s]he is not working, and when [s]he is working
[s]he does not feel at home. [Her] labor is therefore not voluntary, but coerced; it is forced labor.” Id. at 30.
95 SeeMARX, supra note 89, at 8-9.
96 Id. at 8-12.
97 SeeMARX, supra note 89, at 308.
98 KARL MARX, CAPITAL: A CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (Frederick Engels ed., 1867), reprinted in
MARXISTS.ORG 1, 150 (Zodiac et al. eds.), https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf/Capital-Volume-
I.pdf [https://perma.cc/D89V-XWUZ] (last visited Apr. 27, 2021).
99 Gary Lapon, What Do We Mean By Exploitation? Sᴏᴄɪᴀʟɪsᴛ Wᴏʀᴋᴇʀ (Sept. 28, 2011), https://




of her labor, the employer becomes rich from the worker’s labor, and this wealth in turn increases the
employer’s power over her.100
If we apply these terms to the labor of pregnancy and reproduction, a person who becomes
pregnant and chooses to have a baby that she will later raise herself is not an alienated worker because
she controls the labor process, and because the product of her labor belongs to her, not to another.
Although we do not (and should not) think of a child as simply a “product,” in legal terms a modern
U.S. gestator’s children do belong to her, although not as property. A gestating parent typically enjoys a
legal presumption of maternity that arises from having given birth.101 Until they choose to give the
child up for adoption or their child is removed based on serious neglect or abuse, such a parent has
the right to “care, custody and control” of their own children.102 Ideally, a person chooses to become
pregnant and perform the labor of pregnancy as an expression of their own creativity and humanity.
But even where a pregnancy is unplanned, unwanted, or otherwise emotionally fraught, the gestator
retains control over the process and product of their labor. For a pregnant adult, they alone have the
right to choose how to conduct themself during her pregnancy, they alone have the right to choose
their doctor, they alone have the legal authority to decide whether they should terminate the
pregnancy, relinquish their parental rights, or raise the child themself.103 Notwithstanding the many
government restrictions upon abortion, this is still a far cry from a scheme in which a pregnant
person would have to get permission from the biological father, or from her employer, in order to
make these decisions.
Surrogacy contracts purport to change this.104Where they are enforced, a surrogacy contract
will stipulate that the baby does not belong to the gestator/worker but rather to the so-called
“intended parents,” typically, the biological father.105 In the case of commercial surrogacy, the
100 See Estranged Labor, supra note 92, at 29 (“So much does the appropriation of the object appear as
estrangement that the more objects the worker produces the less he can possess and the more he falls under the sway of his
product, capital.”).
101 See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 201 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017) (stating that a parent-child relationship is
established by giving birth, except in the case of a surrogacy contract). This of course was different for enslaved women in the
U.S. whose children were legally the property of her enslaver. Today, non-gestating genetic parents typically have to do
something in addition to proving their genetic connection to establish legal parenthood (such as hold themselves out as the
father or be married to the birth mother). See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 126 (1989) (finding that the burden rested
on the natural father to establish that parental rights over the child were so “deeply embedded in our traditions as to be a
fundamental right”). Non-gestating non-genetic parents usually have to go through additional legal hurdles to establish
parenthood, such as second parent adoption. The differences in laws between US states create insecurity, and the situation is
widely criticized as adding arbitrary hurdles for LGBTQ families. See Elizabeth A. Harris, Same-Sex Parents Still Face Legal
Complications, N.Y. Tɪᴍᴇs (June 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/20/us/gay-pride-lgbtq-same-sex-parents.html
[https://perma.cc/AL3B-STZK] (last visited Apr. 7, 2021).
102 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000).
103 Many states have laws which require minors seeking abortions to get the permission of their parent or have a
judge find them competent to make the decision themselves. See e.g., Parental Involvement in Minors’ Abortions,
GUTTMACHER INST. (Apr. 1, 2021), https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/parental-involvement-minors-
abortions [https://perma.cc/8L6W-FQ6M] (last visited Apr. 7, 2021).
104 Courtney Joslin writes, “[i]n the past, the person who gave birth was always considered a legal parent. Hence,
children always had mothers at birth. But under permissive surrogacy laws, the person who gave birth may not be the child’s
legal parent at birth.” Joslin, supra note 13, at 6.
105 See, e.g., Cook v. Harding, 879 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2018) (noting that the contract provided for the
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intended parents’ right to the child is based on the contract and by the fee that they paid. A
commercial surrogate is paid a fee for her services, transforming the process of pregnancy into a form
of waged labor. In this way, she no longer has a right to the product of her labor but only to the
wage. Furthermore, in many instances, the process of pregnancy is also heavily controlled by the
intended parents, with surrogacy contracts including clauses that limit the pregnant person’s right to
choose their doctor, the foods they can eat during the pregnancy, and more.106 In Marxist terms, we
could say that commercial surrogates perform alienated or estranged labor.
The Marxist-feminist philosopher Kelly Oliver uses Marx’s theory of estranged, or alienated,
labor to analyze surrogacy, arguing that “whereas much of Marx’s analysis of estranged labor applies
only metaphorically to other forms of labor, it applies literally to surrogacy.” Moreover, the labor of
surrogacy can be seen as “doubly estranged”107:
[t]he ‘surrogate’ is seen, andsees herself, as a fragment of a woman, a womb and/or
egg. Her body itself is seen as a machine which can be rented out. Unlike other
workers, she is not an appendage of a machine. She is the machine. Her body
becomes the machinery of production over which the contractor has ultimate
control (internal quotations omitted).108
According to Marx, workers only feel free when they are outside of work using their bodies
in basic functions like eating, sleeping, and having sex.109 For Oliver, the surrogate is even worse off
because the labor of pregnancy never stops, and because the contracts purport to control her body
itself. Furthermore, instead of engaging in a conscious human labor activity, the surrogate’s labor is
reduced to the functions of her body, and thus “[e]ven her human production is only animal
reproduction.”110
Oliver argues that the liberal framework that sees surrogacy as a free exchange between
autonomous individuals disguises the social context of their interaction, most importantly, the power
differential between the actors. The practice of putting the intended parents (and not the surrogate)
on the birth certificate illustrates the fraudulence of this arrangement.111 Thus, “Marx’s analysis of
estranged labor has helped to reveal that the ‘surrogate’ mother is the real mother of the child.”112
Instead of selling her labor, “the ‘surrogate’ is not renting her womb, but selling herself and her child.
She is not free either when she enters the contract or after.”113 This is because it is the economic
system that forced her into making the choice to become a surrogate.
Oliver is careful to distinguish the empirical from the normative in her Marxian analysis.
Even though commercial surrogacy under capitalism effectively treats children as products and
gestator’s parental rights being terminated by a court order prior to birth, leaving the sperm provider as the only legal parent).
106 Berk, supra note 29, at 157.
107 Kelly Oliver, Marxism and Surrogacy, 4 Hʏᴘᴀᴛɪᴀ 95, 105 (1989).
108 Id. at 106.
109 Estranged Labor, supra note 92, at 30.
110 Id. at 106-7.
111 Id. at 109.
112 Id.




mothers as the “machinery of production,” this is not how she believes things ought to be. Thus she
rejects a “crude” Marxist analysis which would reify these categories and “perpetuate the very
structure which it proposes to undermine.” \114 Instead, we may preserve some aspect of humanity
under capitalism by insisting on the real human relationship between the parties, which may involve
economic exchange but which is not reducible to that exchange. Thus we can simultaneously
recognize how the capitalist legal system seeks to treat the surrogate as nothing but a machine, while
recognizing her rightful status as a mother and a human being.
C. Commodification vs. Decommodification
Commodification has been the term that social theorists use to describe the process of
making something into an object to be bought and sold in a market, i.e., a commodity. Where many
premodern societies treated land as a public good or a commons, under capitalism, land becomes a
commodity.115 This process happens repeatedly as capital finds more ways to turn the natural world
and human relations into products for sale.116
In the Information Age, knowledge, ideas and culture are the hot commodities.
Intellectual property is America’s most important export . . . traditional knowledge
and genetic resources in the developing world stand at the center of global
struggles for control of these valuable resources. Corporations mine everything
from forests to medical patients for ‘raw materials’ for their lucrative patents.117
Yet even under a capitalist system, most people think that there should be limits on what
can be bought and sold. This is because the brutality of commodification is undeniable in some
iterations. Slavery, of course, is the ultimate commodification: ““the reduction of persons to
things.”118 If we accept that slavery should be illegal even in a free market capitalist society, then we
are accepting that there should be limitations on the market. Similarly, many people who are generally
in favor the free market still think that selling human organs is a bad idea, or that selling elections or
votes should not be permitted. The question becomes where to draw that line.
For Marxists, these attempts to reserve some areas of society as protected from the market
are likely to come under stress and pressure due to capitalism’s inherent drive to expand. In the
Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels explained, “The need of a constantly expanding market for
its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere,
114 Id.
115 The transformation of land into a commodity is a major topic of Karl Polanyi’s The Great Transformation:
The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time. KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND
ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF OUR TIME (Beacon 2d ed. 2001). The privatization of land and resulting dispossession of peasants
from it is also discussed by Marx, a process he calls “primitive accumulation.” SeeMARX, supra note 98, at 507-09, 512-13.
116 Nancy Holmstrom, The Dialectic of the Individual and the Collective: An Ecological Imperative, 21 RADICAL PHIL.
REV. 77, 79-80 (2018) (internal citations omitted).
117 Margaret Jane Radin & Madhavi Sunder, Introduction: The Subject and Object of Commodification in Rᴇᴛʜɪɴᴋɪɴɢ
Cᴏᴍᴍᴏᴅɪғɪᴄᴀᴛɪᴏɴ 8, 9 (Martha Ertman & Joan C. Williams eds., 2005).
118 Id.
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settle everywhere, establish connexions [sic] everywhere.”119 In order to establish capitalist
relationships, societies must first undergo a process of “primitive accumulation,” in which the
majority of people are stripped of their traditional land rights, so that they are then “freed” to become
wage laborers.120
Some Marxist theorists, starting with Rosa Luxemburg and recently David Harvey, have
argued that primitive accumulation is an ongoing feature of capitalism.121 Capitalism is by its nature
expansionary, expanding both into non-capitalist areas of the globe, (hence the necessity of
imperialism, as Luxemburg argued), and extending its reach within capitalist societies by
commodifying what had been free, whether it be parts of nature like air and water, or labor (care
work for example) or public services (such as public schools).122
Thus, commodification is an inherent driver of capitalism. Ultimately, capitalism turns
workers themselves into commodities, as they must sell their own labor power in the market in order
to live. Marx writes, “Labor produces not only commodities; it produces itself and the worker as a
commodity – and this at the same rate at which it produces commodities in general.”123 Commodified
human social interaction creates alienated relationships, while the market comes to dominate all our
lives, dividing society into haves and have nots.
Building upon Marxist theory, the legal theorist Margaret Jane Radin argues that human
flourishing requires limiting markets and commodification. Radin centers her argument on a holistic
concept of the self. Where liberal theorists have posited negative liberty as key to human freedom,
Radin posits that human flourishing requires positive supports for the things that humans collectively
and individually need. Where market ideologies see freedom in the ability to alienate aspects of
ourselves in order to maximize profit, Radin argues:
A better view of personhood should understand many kinds of particulars—one’s
politics, work, religion, family, love, sexuality, friendships, altruism, experiences,
wisdom, moral commitments, character, and personal attributes—as integral to the
self. To understand any of these as monetizable or completely detachable from the
person—to think, for example, that the value of one person’s moral commitments
is commensurate or fungible with those of another, or that the “same” person
remains when her moral commitments are subtracted—is to do violence to our
deepest understanding of what it is to be human.124
Fully developed, flourishing, personhood requires the ability to make free choices about our
own lives, the ability to have stable relationships with other people and our environment, the ability
to engage in creative pursuits and sexual expression, the ability to maintain bodily autonomy, and
others.
119 Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto, in Tʜᴇ Mᴀʀx-Eɴɢᴇʟs Rᴇᴀᴅᴇʀ 469, 476 (Robert C.
Tucker ed., 1978).
120 MARX, supra note 98, at 508.
121 Holmstrom, supra note 117, at 79-80.
122 Id.
123 Estranged Labor, supra note 92, at 28-29.




In order to protect that flourishing self-development, Radin proposes making things that are
deeply connected to our personhood market-inalienable, meaning that they cannot be separated from a
person by sale (although they may be voluntarily relinquished).125
When something is noncommodifiable, market trading is a disallowed form of
social organization and allocation. We place that thing beyond supply and demand
pricing, brokerage and arbitrage, advertising and marketing, stockpiling,
speculation, and valuation in terms of the opportunity cost of production.126
Examples of things that are market-inalienable in the U.S. today would be kidneys and
children whose birth is not arranged through surrogacy. Although some liberal theorists see market
inalienability as a restriction on human freedom, Radin’s discussion of personhood casts this in a
different light.
[i]f we reject the notion that freedom means negative liberty, and the notion that
liberty and alienation in markets are identical or necessarily connected, then
inalienability will cease to seem inherently paternalistic. If we adopt a positive view
of liberty that includes proper self-development as necessary for freedom, then
inalienabilities needed to foster that development will be seen as freedom-
enhancing rather than as impositions of unwanted restraints on our desires to
transact in markets.127
However, instituting market-inalienability into public policy is not a simple task in Radin’s
view. We live in a vastly unequal and difficult society, and in many instances, commodification is
important to how people survive day to day. If we had a robust social welfare state, many of the more
contested examples of commodification would be less frequently found, as fewer people would need
to sell deeply personal things in order to live. But without social welfare guarantees, people have few
options. Radin provides the example of using tort damages to compensate family members for the
death of a loved one. Many people feel uncomfortable with the way that these remedies seem to put a
price on human life, especially as it tends to reinforce existing inequalities by providing greater
compensation for the loss of a person with anticipated higher-earnings.128 If we had a society in
which everyone’s basic needs were met and families did not have to depend on each other for
financial stability, then there would be less need to provide financial damages to surviving family
members when a wage earner dies. But in the meantime, to deny such compensation to family
125 MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 19 (1996).
126 Radin, supra note 124, at 1855.
127 Id. at 1899.
128 “To determine loss of future earning capacity, courts typically instruct the jury to determine the plaintiff’s future
earnings for the duration of his or her worklife expectancy . . . Since women and blacks fare worse in the labor market, they
fare worse in torts as well.” Similarly, “Most courts prefer that projected average earnings be adjusted according to predictions
particularized to the plaintiffs regarding their likely educational attainment, in light of their personal characteristics and family
background . . . Such projections reinforce the already existent discriminatory effects of plaintiffs’ race or gender on their
access to education and opportunities and essentially perpetuate that discrimination into the future.” Ronen Avraham &
Kimberly Yuracko, Torts and Discrimination, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 661, 673 (2017).
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members who will legitimately suffer a loss of income as a result of the death would seem to only
make the situation worse. This is what Radin calls the “double bind,” in which both commodification
and complete decommodification may both cause harm. In situations like these, Radin suggests that
we accept incomplete commodification as a medium-term solution. Thus we can allow a price to be put on
human life in the limited instance of tort damages, but not in other instances such as buying and
selling humans in enslavement.
Radin also uses this concept of incomplete commodification to describe many kinds of
regulations on business. For example, labor is commodified under capitalism, but regulation and
collective bargaining limit the full force of the market upon labor. Housing is also commodified, but
regulations can limit the full impact of the market upon tenants.129 Limiting the force of the market
allows people to place non-market values upon things that are important to their personhood. For
example, collective bargaining can help workers have a say in their workplace, limiting the level of
alienation that they experience at work and allowing a more flourishing self to emerge. Residential
rent control allows people to have stable homes and communities, also necessary for human
flourishing. In this way, the market economy can be overlayered with non-market values, enabling
people a better quality of life within capitalism.
As applied to surrogacy, Radin argues that human reproduction is one area that is often very
central to people’s conceptions of themselves. For this reason, she argues for making women’s
reproductive capacities market-inalienable, by prohibiting commercial surrogacy but allowing altruistic
surrogacy (that is, unpaid surrogacy that is motivated by a desire to help someone have a child). An
important part of Radin’s concept of personhood is that people may freely give of themselves, thus
ideally sex is a “sharing of selves” rather than an exchange of services.130 Where it is based upon a
true desire for mutual aid and human connection, altruistic surrogacy would fit this model. If
commercial surrogacy is to be allowed, Radin suggests an incomplete commodification. Surrogacy
could be compensated, but we should prohibit courts from enforcing surrogacy agreements through
specific performance, which would treat children as goods to be handed over.131 By limiting the
ability of persons to sell their reproductive capacities and children, we would help preserve a situation
in which biological reproduction and relationships with children are kept as a part of ourselves, rather
than resources to be maximized for profit.
Beyond the individual persons involved in a surrogacy transaction, Radin argues that
commodification impacts all of society through the way it makes us think. She asks,
If a capitalist baby industry were to come into being, with all of its accompanying
paraphernalia, how could any of us, even these who did not produce infants for
sale, avoid subconsciously measuring the dollar value of our children? How could
our children avoid being preoccupied with measuring their own dollar value?132
When pregnancy is a transaction and a child is a product, the values inherent in these
conceptions may “shape our reasoning and description, and the shape (for us) of reality itself.”133 At
129 Id. at 1857.
130 Id. at 1908.
131 Id. at 1935 n.294.
132 Id. at 1926.




its core, “[c]onceiving of any child in market rhetoric wrongs personhood.”134 We are better able to
see the intrinsic value of children as human beings when we are not conceiving of them as objects.
Furthermore, it would be unsurprising if “the market value of babies [were] decided in ways injurious
to their personhood and to the personhood of those who buy and sell on this basis, exacerbating
class, race, and gender divisions.135 For example, if the market value of Black babies was cheaper than
white babies, it’s easy to see how this would negatively affect Black people in general, not just the
babies bought and sold. In this way, instances of commodification such as commercial surrogacy
impact all of our lives, not simply the persons directly involved. Fostering a better society requires
limiting our ability to conceive of ourselves and each other as monetizable objects.
With her concepts of market-inalienability and incomplete commodification, Radin posits
herself as a pluralist, somewhere in the middle in between Marxists who believe in “universal
noncommodification,” and thinkers in the “law and economics” tradition such as Richard Posner,
who believe that everything is, or should be, a commodity.136 However, she acknowledges that “some
who espouse universal noncommodification for the long run might espouse pluralism in the short
run, if they think that introducing piecemeal market-inalienabilities is a way of making progress
toward universal noncommodification .137 Radin calls these two approaches the “evolutionary”
approach, which views specific instances of market-inalienabilities as a path towards universal non-
commodification, versus the “revolutionary” approach, which accepts nothing less than universal
noncommodification. I would argue that, in fact, left-wing social movements influenced by Marxism
have generally embraced a version of what Radin calls the “evolutionary” approach to achieving
universal noncommodification. Protecting certain lands from private development, defending public
schools from privatization, defending public housing from privatization, and similar struggles all
entail restricting the market to its current boundaries, preventing commodification from reaching
these critical areas. These movements have advocated for policies that would expand protection from
the market to new areas. A current example of this is the growing movement to decommodify our
healthcare system, with its primary political demand of “Medicare for All.”138 When activists and
politicians, from ACT UP to Bernie Sanders, use the slogan “healthcare is a human right,”139 they are
asserting that healthcare must be transformed from a capitalist business into a public good based on
mutual care. In the same way, restricting commercial surrogacy could be a piecemeal market-
inalienability which, combined with others, would insulate society from the rule of the market and
gradually lessen its impact.
Some might think that restricting surrogacy is not simply an economic regulation to protect
workers’ rights, but rather expresses normative social values that are inappropriate for the state to
134 Id. at 1927.
135 Id. at 1927.
136 RADIN, supra note 125, at 3; Radin, supra note 124, at 1857-8, 1903.
137 Radin, supra note 124, at 1875.
138 See, e.g., Health Care as a Human Right – Medicare For All, BERNIE SANDERS, https://berniesanders.com/issues/
medicare-for-all/ [https://perma.cc/N6FZ-5DTR] (last visited Apr. 28, 2021).
139 See Jim Hubbard, ACT UP Changed Everything, THE NATION (June 29, 2019),
https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/act-up-stonewall/ (“ACT UP made ‘health care is a right’ into a mainstream idea,
even if that concept is still being challenged 30 years on.”); Bernie Sanders (@BernieSanders), TWITTER (Mar. 12, 2020, 5:10
PM), https://twitter.com/berniesanders/status/1238210867734380551?lang=en [https://perma.cc/SB2W-BVH3] (last visited
Apr. 28, 2021) (tweeting “[h]ealth care is a human right”).
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impose. This misunderstands the stakes of all economic regulations. Labor regulations have always
been about more than wages and hours. Rather, they are about workers’ dignity; their value as a
member of society; their rights to have a say in how they spend their workdays; their worth
irrespective of their race, gender, sexuality; and other normative values.140 Normative values are also
expressed in any legal limitation on commodification. The normative value of the natural
environment as something that should protected is one example. The normative value of disallowing
baby selling is another. Every economic regulation involves a judgement about what kinds of
economic conditions will promote a healthy society for all.
Feminists are of course right to be concerned about government regulation of women’s
reproductive choices based upon normative values, since those in power are so often men who are
seeking to control women’s bodies. However, my argument is that banning commercial surrogacy is
fundamentally an economic regulation, rather than a personal one. Altruistic surrogacy has never been
subject to penalties in the U.S.;141 thus there is no intervention into women’s personal choices about
why, with whom, and how, they choose to reproduce. Banning commercial surrogacy must also be
distinguished from laws against sex work, since those typically involve criminal sanctions for the
140 See generally NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, STATE OF THEUNION: A CENTURY OF AMERICAN LABOR (2002).
141 According to Courtney Joslin’s extensive study of all surrogacy statutes nationally, only Arizona, Indiana,
Louisiana, Michigan, New York, and North Dakota have (or recently had) civil bans that prohibit altruistic surrogacy
agreements. Courtney Joslin, (Not) Just Surrogacy, 109 CAL. L. REV., 69-72 (forthcoming 2021). However, a look into the details
shows that these statutes only provide that such contracts are unenforceable and/or have provisions making the gestational
mother in a surrogacy contract the legal mother; they do not impose penalties upon parties who enter into uncompensated
surrogacy agreements. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-218A (“No person may enter into, induce, arrange, procure or otherwise
assist in the formation of a surrogate parentage contract”); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-20-1-1 (“The general assembly declares
that it is against public policy to enforce any term of a surrogate agreement that requires a surrogate to do any of the following:
(1) Provide a gamete to conceive a child. (2) Become pregnant. (3) Consent to undergo or undergo an abortion. (4) Undergo
medical or psychological treatment or examination. (5) Use a substance or engage in activity only in accordance with the
demands of another person. (6) Waive parental rights or duties to a child. (7) Terminate care, custody, or control of a child. (8)
Consent to a stepparent adoption under IC 31-19 (or IC 31-3-1 before its repeal).); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2719 (applies
to “traditional” or genetic surrogacy only) (“A contract for a genetic gestational carrier shall be absolutely null.”); MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 722.855 (“A surrogate parentage contract is void and unenforceable as contrary to public policy”), § 722.859
(“(1) A person shall not enter into, induce, arrange, procure, or otherwise assist in the formation of a surrogate parentage
contract for compensation. (2) A participating party other than an unemancipated minor female or a female diagnosed as being
intellectually disabled or as having a mental illness or developmental disability who knowingly enters into a surrogate parentage
contract for compensation is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more than $10,000.00 or imprisonment for
not more than 1 year, or both. (3) A person other than a participating party who induces, arranges, procures, or otherwise
assists in the formation of a surrogate parentage contract for compensation is guilty of a felony punishable by a fine of not
more than $50,000.00 or imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both.”); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 122 (“Genetic
surrogate parenting agreements are hereby declared contrary to public policy of this state, and are void and unenforceable”),
§ 123 (“No person or other entity shall knowingly request, accept, receive, pay or give any fee, compensation or other
remuneration, directly or indirectly, in connection with any genetic surrogate parenting agreement, or induce, arrange or
otherwise assist in arranging a genetic surrogate parenting agreement for a fee, compensation or other remuneration . . . Any
party to a genetic surrogate parenting agreement or the spouse of any part to a genetic surrogate parenting agreement who
violate this section shall be subject to a civil penalty not to exceed five hundred dollars.”); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-18-
05 (“Any agreement in which a woman agrees to become a surrogate or to relinquish that woman’s rights and duties as parent
of a child conceived through assisted conception is void. The surrogate, however, is the mother of a resulting child and the
surrogate’s husband, if a party to the agreement, is the father of the child. If the surrogate’s husband is not a party to the




workers. Criminal penalties for women acting as commercial surrogates have not been a salient
feature of surrogacy bans in the U.S. context,142 and thus the criminalization of women’s choices
about how to use their bodies is not at issue. Instead, the question of commercial surrogacy is about
whether we believe that this activity ought to be a capitalist business, or one whose transactions are upheld
with the coercive power of the legal system. The question becomes in Radin’s terms: will such an industry
promote human flourishing? This brings us to the question of the social meaning of the surrogacy
industry, and the vision of society that it promotes.
III. THE SOCIAL MEANING OF THE SURROGACY INDUSTRY
The surrogacy industry has always represented and promoted a white, patriarchal, and elite
conception of family at the expense of oppressed groups. When surrogacy was first introduced in the
U.S., it immediately prompted comparisons to slavery. As Angela Davis wrote,
Slave women were birth mothers or genetic mothers – to employ terms rendered
possible by the new reproductive technologies – but they possessed no legal rights
as mothers, of any kind. Considering the commodification of their children – and
indeed, of their own persons – their status was similar to that of the contemporary
surrogate mother.143
The history of chattel slavery should particularly warn us of the dangers of the legal
commodification of human life, including reproduction. Anita Allen wrote, “The American slave
experience, while not equivalent to surrogacy, can help illuminate why many people find the practice
of commercial surrogacy disturbing.”144 Since the reproductive capacities of enslaved women were
used for the benefit of their enslavers,145 the prospect of women’s reproductive capacities being used
for profit is disturbing. The commodification of children is also deeply concerning. Although clearly
not equivalent to slavery, the legacy of chattel slavery has rightfully created a strong aversion to any
legal commodification of human life. As Radin argues, commodification does not simply operate in
the market but also is a feature of our ideas and thoughts.146 Thus, breaking down the normative
142 See Joslin, supra note 13, Appendix A (describing how only Michigan provides for criminal penalties for parties
to surrogacy contracts). In Michigan, any mentally competent adult who knowingly enters into a commercial surrogacy contract
is guilty of a misdemeanor and punishable by a fine not to exceed $10,000 or one year in prison. MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 722.859(2). Brokers who arrange these agreements are subject to a felony charge and a fine not to exceed $50,000 or up to 5
years in prison. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.859(3). In New York, NY Dom. Rel. Law § 123 allows for the surrogate, her
husband, and the intended parents to be fined up to $500, and the broker could be fined up to $10,000 (the NY State
Assembly has introduced a bill to repeal the law). NY Dom. Rel. Law § 123. For a second infraction, the broker could be
charged with a felony, but there were no criminal penalties to the surrogate herself. NY Dom. Rel. Law § 123. According to
Lori Andrews, in 1995 there were four US states that had criminal penalties for women acting as surrogates. Lori Andrews,
Beyond Doctrinal Boundaries: A Legal Framework for Surrogate Motherhood, 81 VA. L. REV. 2343, 2350 (1995). However, it is also
worth noting that even though these penalties are on the books, their application may be quite rare given the disincentives to
enter into surrogacy contracts in states in which they are unenforceable.
143 Angela Davis, Surrogates and Outcast Mothers, in Tʜᴇ Aɴɢᴇʟᴀ Y. Dᴀᴠɪs Rᴇᴀᴅᴇʀ 210, 212 (Joy James ed., 1998).
144 Allen, supra note 74, at 17.
145 Id. at 18.
146 See Radin, supra note 124, at 1879 (noting Richard Posner’s market conception of sexual assault).
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aversion to commodifying human life is not a trivial thing but rather can affect how people think and
feel for the worse.
Given the long history of working-class women, especially women of color, performing
household labor including childcare, Davis argued that surrogacy was just a new iteration of this
longstanding exploitative-type of relationship. Perhaps in the future, embryo implantation could allow
wealthy, privileged women to opt out of the messy business of pregnancy and childbirth entirely.
Davis asked, “Considering this previous history, is it not possible to imagine the possibility that poor
women—especially poor women of color—might be transformed into a special caste of hired
pregnancy carriers?”147 In 1993, Johnson v. Calvert validated these fears: a Black surrogate lost her fight
to gain joint custody over the baby she had gestated, who was of white and Philippine genetic
descent.148 This led some Black feminists to wonder if Black women would become targets for
recruitment to work as commercial surrogates.149 Given that the deeply racist family court system
would be unlikely to award custody of a white child to a Black woman, “Black gestators could be the
safest surrogate mothers for white women who want white children.”150
Furthermore, commercial surrogacy had an ideological power that extended far beyond the
people who actually participated in it. As Dorothy Roberts has argued, surrogacy and assisted
reproductive technology serve to exalt white reproduction and white babies, at the same time as our
society denigrates Black reproduction and Black children:
The monumental effort, expense, and technological invention that goes into the
new reproduction marks the children produced as especially valuable. It proclaims
the unmistakable message that white children merit the spending of billions of
dollars toward their creation. Black children, on the other hand, are the object of
welfare reform measures designed to discourage poor women’s procreation.151
In this way, the surrogacy industry can fairly be described as a capitalist business that profits
from promoting a culturally white, heteronormative, neo-eugenicist, genetically-defined concept of
parenthood. Like all capitalist industries, it does not simply respond to existing wants but rather
shapes people’s expectations and desires. As influential celebrities like Sarah Jessica Parker, Nicole
Kidman, and Kim Kardashian-West publicly discuss their use of surrogates to expand their families,
genetically-related children, produced at any age and free of bodily complications, become a part of
the constellation of desirable things that people can aspire to have, if only they have the money.152
147 Davis, supra note 143, at 214. See also Beverly Beyette, “Angela Davis Now: On a Quiet Street In Oakland, the
Former Radical Activist Has Settled In but Not Settled Down,” Los Angeles Times (Mar. 8, 1989), available at
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1989-03-08-vw-316-story.html [https://perma.cc/B5TC-QM74].
148 Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 777 (Cal. 1993). See also Allen, supra note 74, at 19.
149 See id. at 18 (internal footnotes omitted) (“Affluent white women’s infertility, sterility, preferences and power
threaten to turn poor Black women, already understood to be a servant class, into a ‘surrogate class.’”). See also generally Deborah
R. Grayson, Mediating Intimacy: Black Surrogate Mothers and the Law, 24 Cʀɪᴛɪᴄᴀʟ Iɴᴏ̨ᴜɪʀʏ 525 (Winter 1998).
150 Allen, supra note 74, at 31.
151 ROBERTS, Kɪʟʟɪɴɢ ᴛʜᴇ Bʟᴀᴄᴋ Bᴏᴅʏ 269 (2d ed. 2017).
152 See Stephanie Petit, Kim Kardashian West Explains Why She Chose To Transfer A Female Embryo To Her Surrogate,
Pᴇᴏᴘʟᴇ (Mar. 13, 2018), available at https://people.com/parents/kim-kardashian-west-female-embryo-surrogacy-daughter-




Kardashian-West described it as “the best experience” she “would recommend [] for anybody.”153
Closely related to the racism discussed above, commercial surrogacy serves to uphold a
narrow, culturally white, heteronormative concept of family. Davis argues that assisted reproductive
technology may be used today by people who, had such technology not existed, might have been
satisfied with (a) non-biological mothering relationship(s). What Davis calls “play motherhood” is
“deeply rooted in the black community tradition of extended families and relationships based both on
biological kinship – though not necessarily biological motherhood-- and on personal history which is
often as binding as biological kinship.” These extended kin networks could mitigate the experience of
infertility by giving infertile people opportunities to be important caretakers and mentors for children
who are not genetically their “own.”154 This is not to suggest that Black and other women of color do
not experience pain due to infertility. There is no denying that “[i]nfertility causes unique
psychological stresses and anxieties, as well as affecting relationships.”155 Moreover, Black women in
the US are at higher risk of infertility than white women.156 Rather than to minimize the pain of
infertility, Davis’ analysis requires us to recognize that such pain is at least somewhat influenced by
ideology and culture, and that the surrogacy industry sharpens these contradictions in painful ways.
By purporting to make the nuclear, genetically-related family available to those who are
infertile through the miracle of technology, the industry reifies the desirableness of this model of
family over other family forms. Even worse, such technologies are only available for those with
enough money. Describing the life of her non-genetically related aunt who had no children of her
own but was a “second mother” to her, Davis asks “If she were alive and in her child-bearing years
today, I wonder whether she would bemoan the fact that she lacked the financial resources to employ
all the various technological means available to women who wish to reverse their infertility. I wonder
if she would have felt a greater compulsion to fulfill a female vocation of motherhood.”157
Furthermore, as Mary Gibson argues, the desire to conform to “the mythical ‘normal’ family
consisting of breadwinning father, nurturing mother (now possibly also a career woman/super-mom),
and their genetic offspring. . . .”158 also likely explains the impulse to deny parental rights to
surrogates. In this way, the surrogacy industry and its legal apparatus upholds the value of nuclear,
genetically related families over other family forms.
at https://www.bbc.com/news/entertainment-arts-12213615 [https://perma.cc/E4BC-N5KB] (last visited Apr. 3, 2021;. This
is notwithstanding the fact that some celebrities are ambiguous about whose genetic material is used in such arrangements. See
Viv Groskop, What is the Truth Behind Sarah Jessica Parker’s Use of a Surrogate?, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 29, 2009), available at
https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2009/apr/30/sarah-jessica-parker-twins-surrogate [https://perma.cc/9QXU-46C
J] (noting that it is not clear if Parker or the surrogate is providing genetic material). In general, ova from persons over age 40
are much less likely to lead to a viable pregnancy. See Holly Eagleson, Your Chances of Getting Pregnant at Every Age, PARENTS
(Aug. 1, 2013), available at https://www.parents.com/getting-pregnant/trying-to-conceive/up-your-chances-of-getting-
pregnant-at-every-age [https://perma.cc/24HN-BNFR] (last visited Apr. 3, 2021).
153 Petit, supra note 152.
154 Davis, supra note 143, at 214.
155 Edna Bonhomme, How the myth of Black hyper-fertility harms us, AL JAZEERA (Aug. 16, 2020),
https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2020/8/16/how-the-myth-of-black-hyper-fertility-harms-us.
156 Annalisa Merelli, Why are Black women at higher risk of infertility?, QUARTZ (Mar. 12, 2021),
https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/us/why-are-black-women-at-higher-risk-of-infertility/ar-BB1ewTfz; Roberts, supra note
151 at 214-215.
157 Davis, supra 143 at 214-215.
158 Gibson, supra note 10, at 66.
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In addition to the racist, neo-eugenic aspects of commercial surrogacy, the critique of
surrogacy on purely feminist grounds is also difficult to refute. Surrogacy as an industry primarily
serves to allow men to have children that are genetically related to them, using women’s bodies as
mere tools towards that end. That multiple women should be asked to undergo invasive procedures,
endure the physical pain of childbirth, and even risk death to ensure the continuation of men’s
genetic material seems to express a normative value that his genetic material is more important than
her life. As Katha Pollitt wrote in 1987, “How can it be acceptable to pay a woman to risk her life,
health and fertility so that a man can have his own biological child, yet morally heinous to pay healthy
people to sacrifice ‘extra’ organs to achieve the incomparably greater aim of saving a life?”159 If it
would be wrong to use the coercive power of money to induce people to do something as potentially
harmful as sell their own organs, then using the coercive inducement of money would also be wrong
for inducing people to endure pregnancy and childbirth, given that both can be life threatening.
The surrogacy industry also promotes a type of pronatalism that can be harmful to women.
Mary Gibson writes, “In our pronatalist society, the desire for children is presumed to be universal,
and parenthood is regarded as a normal and necessary developmental task. Those who do not
conform are stigmatized, regarded as deviant, selfish, emotionally immature, psychologically
maladjusted, sexually inadequate, and unhappy.”160 The importance of children for one’s identity has
typically been even greater for women, given the societal norms that valued motherhood as women’s
most important role.161 As Angela Davis argued, the assisted reproductive technology industry as a
whole reinforces women’s stereotypical role as mothers and creates additional pressures upon women
to pursue every possible option to become mothers, often at great personal expense. The capitalist
reproductive industry “sends out a message to those who are capable of receiving it: motherhood lies
just beyond the next technology.”162
The culturally conditioned desire to be nurturers may also propel some women into
becoming commercial surrogates.163 This altruistic desire to assist the infertile could make women
vulnerable to exploitation, as brokers and fertility companies seek to manipulate these emotions
towards their own profitable ends.164 The industry thus seems to promote a particularly gendered
version of altruism, “which demands radical self-effacement, alienation from those whom one
benefits, and subordination of one’s body, health, and emotional life to the independently defined
interests of others.”165
159 Pollitt, supra note 9.
160 Gibson, supra note 10, at 64.
161 Id.
162 Davis, supra note 143, at 215.
163 Gibson, supra note 10, at 65.
164 For example, the website of the company American Surrogacy says, “[l]et’s be honest — becoming a
surrogate mother is a demanding process, asking you to meet a number of requirements, attend numerous doctor
appointments, take various fertility medications, and of course, carry a baby for nine months. And yet, here you are,
researching how you can help make another person or couple’s dream of becoming parents come true by becoming a surrogate
— because of how much it means to them and how much it means to you. . . . Surrogates should be motivated by an altruistic
desire to help other people become parents. If you’re mainly motivated by surrogate compensation, you may rethink the reason
why you want to be a surrogate mother.” How to Become a Surrogate, AM. SURROGACY, https://www.americansurrogacy
.com/surrogate/how-to-become-a-surrogate [https://perma.cc/8623-E8FM] (last visited Apr. 28, 2021).




Furthermore, when courts uphold surrogacy arrangements, they seem inevitably to reify the
value of the male genetic connection at the expense of all other values. After the New Jersey lower
court upheld the contract in Baby M, Pollitt wrote,
The Baby M decision did not disclaim the power of biology at all: it exalted male
biology at the expense of female. Judge Sorkow paid tribute to Mr. Stern’s drive to
procreate; it was only Mrs. Whitehead’s longing to nurture that he scorned. That
Baby M had Mr. Stern’s genes was judged a fact of supreme importance-more
important than Mrs. Whitehead’s genes, pregnancy and childbirth put together. We
might as well be back in the days when a woman was seen merely as a kind of
human potting soil for a man’s seed.166
This implication is amplified by the use of gestational surrogacy. The use of an anonymous
egg donor who has no legal rights, combined with a gestational mother who also has no legal rights to
the child, allows men to create children that are legally related only to them. In this way, gestational
surrogacy elevates men’s power vis-à-vis the mothers of their children to a degree not seen before.
Pollitt argues,
What William Stern wanted . . . was not just a perfect baby . . . He wanted a perfect
baby with his genes and a medically vetted mother who would get out of his life
forever immediately after giving birth. That’s a tall order, and one no other class of
father–natural, step-, adoptive–even claims to be entitled to. Why should the law
bend itself into a pretzel to gratify it?167
The question of what precisely is being sold in the case of surrogacy also seems to turn upon
people’s relative valuation of men’s and women’s contributions to baby-making. Proponents of
surrogacy typically argue that only gestational services are being sold. For example, legal scholars J.
Brad Reich and Dawn Swink suggest that gestational surrogacy should legally be conceived of as a
bailment: “[a] delivery of personal property by one person (the bailor) to another (the bailee) who
holds the property for a certain purpose, . . . [usually] under an express or implied-in fact contract.”168
They continue, “When embryos are property, surrogacy is legally a mutual bailment. In a mutual
bailment the bailee must take reasonable care of the bailed property,”169 and is liable for damages if
for failing to do so.
Some proponents use this framework to describe even “traditional” surrogacy, in which the
surrogate uses her own ova and thus is a genetic parent of the child. This raises the issue of how to
distinguish such “surrogacy” arrangements from paying someone to give a child up for adoption
whom they had conceived naturally (typically referred to as “baby-selling”). Radin writes,
If we think that ordinarily a mother paid to relinquish a baby for adoption is selling
166 Pollitt, supra note 9.
167 Id.
168 J. Brad Reich & Dawn Swink, Outsourcing Reproduction: Embryos and Surrogacy Services in the Cyberprocreation Era,
14 J. HEALTHCARE L. & Pᴏʟ’Y 241, 292 (2011).
169 Id. (internal citations omitted).
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a baby, but that if she is a surrogate, she is merely selling gestational services, it
seems we are assuming that the baby cannot be considered the surrogate’s
property, so as to become alienable by her, but that her gestational services can be
considered property and therefore become alienable.170
While we don’t permit baby-selling, it is understood that it involves selling something more
than a gestational service. Radin suggests that “conceiving of the ‘good’ as gestational services . . .
reflects an understanding that the baby is already someone else’s property—the father’s. This
characterization of the interaction can be understood as both complete commodification in rhetoric
and an expression of gender hierarchy.”171
A strict application of contract law principles would support the hypothesis that what is
being sold is a baby, rather than merely services. Specific performance is presumptively not available
for service contracts, but it can be a remedy for breaches of contracts for rare or unique goods.172
Thus, when a court orders a surrogate to physically relinquish control of a child, the court is treating
the child as a unique good. Furthermore, most surrogacy contracts entail that the surrogate relinquish
her parental rights to the child. A promise to refrain from doing something that the promisor would
otherwise be legally permitted to do constitutes consideration.173 The difference between selling a
baby and selling rights to a baby seems nebulous at best.174 Furthermore, the law readily understands
that many contracts involve both a combination of goods and services. Contracts for custom-made
goods will generally be treated as goods contracts rather than service contracts under the
“predominant purpose” rule.175 It seems quite obvious that the predominant purpose of a surrogacy
contract is to produce a baby. As Elizabeth Anderson argues, the intended parent “would not pay [the
surrogate] for the ‘service’ of carrying the child to term if she refused to relinquish her parental rights
to it.”176 The fact that so many courts are willing to see these relationships as services alone shows the
depth of this bias.
In this way, surrogacy elevates cis men’s legal control over their children by legally excising
gestators, typically women, from the picture. Surrogacy also elevates men’s role ideologically, by
promoting the idea that cis men alone can produce children, despite their biological need to
collaborate with someone with a uterus to do so.177 To be clear, I don’t think any proponents of such
feminist arguments reject the idea that gay men and single men can be excellent parents. They can be,
and furthermore I believe that men taking on more active roles in childrearing is good for gender
equality. One day, ectogenesis may allow the creation of babies outside of a human body, and perhaps
170 Radin, supra note 124, at 1929.
171 Id.
172 25 WILLISTON& LORD, supra note 77, at § 67:106; U.C.C. § 2-716 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2020)
173 See, e.g., Hamer v. Sidway, 27 N.E. 256 (N.Y. 1891).
174 Anita L. Allen has described commercial surrogacy as “trading parental rights for cash.” Anita L. Allen,
Privacy, Surrogacy, and the Baby M Case, 76 GEO. L.J. 1759, 1759 (1988).
175 67 Aᴍ. Jᴜʀ. 2ᴅ Sales §§ 31-32.
176 Anderson, supra note 5, at 78.
177 Although men who have children through surrogacy often have partners that they plan to share parenting
duties with, it is also worth noting that single men are a growing market for surrogacy in the US. See Avichai Scher, Gay Fathers,
Going It Alone, N. Y. Tɪᴍᴇs (Oct. 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/25/nyregion/single-gay-fathers-through-




then cis men could rightfully claim to be the only parents of such children. However, in the
meantime, the feminist objection is against the idea that men should be able to use women’s bodies to
produce children that are biologically related to them without having to also share any rights with
those women.
It is worth noting that in the future, surrogacy may become a more common way for
transgender women to have biological children. However, like many other women who face
biological barriers to gestating their own children, trans women are likely to remain a minority of the
total market for surrogacy. Furthermore, the only trans women who would be able to use commercial
surrogacy would be those who have enough class (and often race) privilege to afford it. The purpose
of this analysis is not to say that commercial surrogacy is inherently exploitative along one single axis
of gender, class, race, sexuality, etc. Rather, the purpose is to show that by its capitalist nature,
commercial surrogacy will typically exacerbate existing social inequalities, at least in aggregate.
A. Surrogacy in global perspective today
Empirical evidence on U.S. surrogates may not fit the image of “extreme” exploitation that
was initially imagined by feminists in the 1990s, but inequality remains and the principled reasons for
opposing commercial surrogacy still hold.
“The profile of surrogate mothers emerging from the empirical research in the United States
and Britain does not support the stereotype of poor, single, young, ethnic minority women whose
family, financial difficulties, or other circumstances pressure her into a surrogacy arrangement.”178 On
the other hand, “[t]ypical intended parents are Caucasian, heterosexual, married, and financially
secure. They want a genetic connection to their children, so they pursue surrogacy. Surrogates are
often married mothers in their twenties or thirties who are white, Christian, and working class.”179
Surrogates in the U.S. are typically from “moderate-income” families.180 U.S. based surrogacy agencies
often exclude women whose income falls below the federal poverty line,181 and various industry
“best-practices” standards recommend against hiring poor women as surrogates.182 One author has
suggested that agencies purposely do not recruit very poor women because they may fear courts
voiding the resulting contracts on grounds of duress or unconscionability.183 As a recent report noted,
“ . . . it is unlikely that intended parents would choose a surrogate who is entirely motivated by
financial remunerations because the intended parents desire a surrogate who is a committed,
emotionally-engaged participant in the surrogacy arrangement.”184 Even if the profile of U.S.
surrogates does not fit the worst-feared image of the surrogate as a desperately poor woman of color,
there is undoubtedly a class divide between surrogates and intended parents. In order for them to be
178 Lina Peng, Surrogate Mothers: An Exploration of the Empirical and the Normative, 21 Aᴍ. U. J. Gᴇɴᴅᴇʀ Sᴏᴄ. Pᴏʟ. &
L. 555, 560 (2013) (quoting Karen Busby & Delaney Vun, Revisiting The Handmaid’s Tale: Feminist Theory Meets Emprical Research
on Surrogate Mothers, 26 CAN. J. FAM. L. 13, 17 (2010)).
179 Machalow, supra note 14, at 1-2.
180 NEWYORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, supra note 7, at 48.
181 Sital Kalantry, Regulating Markets for Gestational Care: Comparative Perspectives on Surrogacy in the United States and
India, 27 CORNELL J. L. PUB. POL’Y 685, 688-89 (2018).
182 NEWYORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, supra note 7, at 48.
183 Kalantry, supra note 186, at 687-87.
184 NEWYORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, supra note 7, at 48.
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motivated to undertake such a significant labor, surrogates must not be indifferent to the prospect of
increasing their income, even at significant personal expense. Furthermore, the rise of surrogacy in
the U.S. has coincided with long term wage stagnation and the severe increase in debt and precarity
among the middle classes.185 This must also be taken into context when evaluating American
women’s motivations for looking for additional sources of income.
Evaluating the evidence that U.S. surrogates are mostly white, Khiara Bridges suggests that
“surrogacy may create a racial catch-22: the commissioning of women of color to act as surrogates
may be as terrifying as the failure to commission women of color to act as surrogates.”186 She further
writes,
We have to wonder why. It might be that the reproductive capacities of white
women are simply more highly valued than those of women of color. It is possible
that wealthy white couples that hire surrogates deem women of color
untrustworthy. They may believe that women of color will somehow harm the
children that they carry.187
This suggests a deeply disturbing and racist devaluation of the reproductive labor of women
of color. Yet to really evaluate whether it is a “problem” for women of color to be absent from this
workforce, one must also ask whether being a surrogate is a “good” job. Considering the low
compensation surrogates receive when calculated as an hourly wage,188 and the risk of health
complications including death, it is hard to see why we would want this job to be more widely
available to anyone.
The explosion of surrogacy in the Global South, mainly serving clients in the global north,
has also prompted calls to reconsider surrogacy. On the one hand, some have interpreted this to
indicate that “the concerns that critical thinkers about race have articulated about the ownership and
exploitation of the bodies of women of color for white benefit have come to be realized.”189 Yet there
has been the impression that some of the loudest critics of surrogacy in the Global South are white
feminists in the Global North who take a paternalistic attitude towards women in the Global
South.190 Western media reporting on surrogacy in India has typically been sensationalist and pitying,
185 Lawrence Mishel, Elise Gould, and Josh Bivens, Wage Stagnation in Nine Charts, Eᴄᴏɴᴏᴍɪᴄ Pᴏʟɪᴄʏ Iɴsᴛɪᴛᴜᴛᴇ
Rᴇᴘᴏʀᴛ, (Jan. 6, 2015) https://www.epi.org/publication/charting-wage-stagnation/ [https://perma.cc/S2UX-5GVT] (last
visited Apr. 21, 2021). See also DEBORA L. SPAR, THE BABY BUSINESS: HOW MONEY, SCIENCE, AND POLITICS DRIVE THE
COMMERCE OF CONCEPTION 74 (2006) (“In the latter decades of the twentieth century . . . surrogacy underwent a significant
revival.”).
186 Khiara M. Bridges, Windsor, Surrogacy, and Race, 89 Wᴀsʜ. L. Rᴇᴠ. 1125, 1141 (2014).
187 Id. at 1140. One explanation that Bridges does not consider is whether women of color are less interested in
becoming surrogates.
188 Surrogates in the US usually receive a fee of $20,000 to $55,000. ALEX FINKELSTEIN ET AL., COLUM. L. SCH.
SEXUALITY & GENDER L. CLINIC, SURROGACY LAW AND POLICY IN THE U.S.: A NATIONAL CONVERSATION INFORMED BY
GLOBAL LAWMAKING 7 (2016), https://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/gender-sexuality/files/columbia
_sexuality_and_gender_law_clinic_-_surrogacy_law_and_policy_report_-_june_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/6Q4X-MYSA]
(last visited Apr. 28, 2021). Nine months is 6,574.5 hours. Thus, the typical wage would range from $3.04 and $8.37 per hour.
189 Id. at 1141.





inevitably describing the women who do this work as “desperately impoverished, malnourished,
oppressed, and uneducated Indian women who are somehow duped into vending their reproductive
services in global intimate industries.”191 Thus sociologists studying commercial surrogacy in India
have been at pains to surface the actual experiences and ideas of these women, whose views are often
more nuanced than the stereotypical narrative of victimhood.192 One such scholar, Sharmila
Rudrappa, has also spoken out against the Indian state’s recent ban on commercial surrogacy, citing
concerns that the industry would simply go underground.193 However there is no substantive
disagreement that the surrogacy industry in the Global South is highly exploitative and arguably racist.
In India at the height of the surrogacy boom, surrogates had little control over medical decisions,
medically unnecessary cesarean sections were routine,194 surrogates had little control over their living
and working conditions, wages were insufficient, and relationships with intended parents are often
disappointing, among other issues.195
If surrogacy in the Global South is a highly exploitative, what does that mean for our
policies in the Global North? Some commentators have argued that surrogacy bans in places like the
U.S. actually push this labor into the Global South.196 Therefore, the policy most in line with the
interests of the exploited women working as surrogates abroad would be to make or keep surrogacy
legal in the Global North, where conditions are likely to be better. Yet the same argument could be
used for any protective labor regulation. Child labor, for example, has been largely eliminated from
the Global North, yet it continues to be prevalent in many parts of the Global South.197 It is well
known that companies move their operations in response to more business-friendly legal
environments, such as the mid-century shift of U.S. manufacturing from the north to the Sun Belt in
the south, which had business-friendly “Right to Work” laws.198 While it is incredibly important for
labor organizers to form ties of solidarity between workers in the Global North and the Global
South, the “solution” to the global “race to the bottom” cannot be for states in the Global North to
lower their labor standards. Furthermore, even if more states in the Global North allowed for
commercial surrogacy, it would still be more vastly more expensive than in the Global South.199 The
existence of surrogacy in the Global South is therefore unlikely to be eliminated by increasing the
191 RUDRAPPA, supra note 25, at 2.
192 See PANDE, supra note 25; RUDRAPPA, supra note 25.
193 Sharmila Rudrappa, Why Is India’s Ban on Commercial Surrogacy Bad for Women?, 43 N.C.J. Iɴᴛ’ʟ L. 70, 72-73
(2018).
194 PANDE, supra note 25, at 117.
195 See RUDRAPPA, supra note 25, at 174.
196 See, e.g., PANDE, supra note 25, at 173-74.
197 Africa and the Asia-Pacific regions have the highest rates of child labor according to the International Labour
Organization. INT’L LABOUR ORG., GLOBAL ESTIMATES OF CHILD LABOUR: RESULTS AND TRENDS, 2012-2016 EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY 10 (2017),
198 See, e.g., Neil Shah & Ben Casselman, ‘Right-to-Work’ Economics, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 14, 2012), https://www.wsj.
com/articles/SB10001424127887324296604578179603136860138 [https://perma.cc/AD67-D3LP] (last visited Apr. 28,
2021).
199 With all fees included, surrogacy in the U.S. can cost over $120,000, while surrogacy in India costs less than
$30,000 as of 2014. Darlena Cunha, The Hidden Costs of International Surrogacy, Tʜᴇ Aᴛʟᴀɴᴛɪᴄ, Dec. 22, 2014, https://
www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/12/the-hidden-costs-of-international-surrogacy/382757/ [https://perma.cc/XH
3M-TYA9] (last visited Apr. 8, 2021).
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legal availability of commercial surrogacy in the Global North.
V. TOWARDS A PRACTICAL, FEMINIST, ANTI-CAPITALIST POLITICS OF SURROGACY
A. At a minimum, we must always protect parental rights of gestators by giving them the right to back out of
surrogacy contracts.
In this section, I will discuss several different theoretical lenses, all of which can be
considered to be coming from a “social justice” perspective.
1. Bodily Autonomy
Even though most people recognize that would-be fathers (and/or others) may have an
interest in the outcome of a pregnancy, feminists have long argued that the ultimate decision should
lie with the pregnant woman because this preserves bodily autonomy. Expanding this logic to
parenthood, we could make a similar feminist argument that the gestator should have the first claim
to parental rights, even where there are other claims based on genetics and/or intention. Although
the baby is no longer literally a part of the woman’s body after the pregnancy has concluded, the
intimate involvement of her body in bringing it into being should still be given great weight.
Pregnancy is by definition, a period of prolonged physical closeness between gestator and child
which, not surprisingly, often creates a strong emotional bond. Once this bond is formed, a forced
separation from the child inflicts a particularly deep type of harm. To avoid such harm, gestators
should always have the right to maintain a relationship with any child that they gestate, if desired.
Such a policy would still allow recognition of other parental claims based upon genetics, intention, or
a subsequently formed relationship. Once recognized, non-gestating parents would have rights vis a
vis their children that are equal to those of the gestating parent.200 This policy would simply ensure
that none of these parties has a parental right that may defeat the gestator’s parental right.
2. Marxism & the Labor Movement
As discussed above, Marx sees the separation of the worker from the fruits of her labor as a
kind of theft. In a similar vein, the socialist and labor movements have long used the slogans “Labor
creates all wealth”201 and as such, “Labor is entitled to all it creates.”202 Applying this principle to
pregnancy, I believe that the gestator, as the person doing the labor of creating the child, should have
200 An exception to this is the “tender years” doctrine, which gives some preference to mothers for custody of
very young children (when they are in their “tender years”). However, this doctrine has been all but abolished, due to changing
social norms and its apparent conflict with non-discrimination law. See 67A C.J.S. Pᴀʀᴇɴᴛ ᴀɴᴅ Cʜɪʟᴅ § 69, at 2 nn.6-12 (citing
lower court decisions finding the “tender years” doctrine an impermissible gender-based preference).
201 See, e.g., Marshall Ward, ‘Labor creates all wealth’, KY. STATE AFL-CIO (Sept. 3, 2018), https://ky.
aflcio.org/news/labor-creates-all-wealth [https://perma.cc/9GQK-7LHE] (last visited Apr. 28, 2021) (describing an 1882
union protest where protestors were chanting “Labor Creates All Wealth”).
202 DSA (@DemSocialists), TWITTER (July 11, 2017, 1:24 AM), https://twitter.com/DemSocialists/status/
884644477977186304 [https://perma.cc/2NAT-WF8P] (last visited Apr. 28, 2021) (a Tweet from the official Democratic




greater rights to that child than the purchaser who paid money for it. Although it may take a
revolution to give all workers the legal right to all that they produce, this doesn’t prevent us from
ensuring that in the meantime, at least reproductive laborers have the legal right to the product of their
own labor. The many states that effectively do so through surrogacy bans demonstrates that this is
possible even under a capitalist system.
Contract principles are particularly inappropriate for deciding intimate personal matters such
as child custody. Contract law is based on holding people to the promises they made in the past,
which is expressed as the parties’ intent at the time of contracting. This has great advantages for
businesses by making commercial dealings more predictable. Our personal lives are quite different.
Instead of holding people to promises made in the past, family law is based on fundamental rights,
principles of equity, and the best interests of the parties moving forward.203 In particular, when
dealing with issues of child custody, courts are governed by the “best interests of the child”
standard.204 The legal doctrine supporting commercial surrogacy reverses this, by using the intent of
the parties at the time of contracting as determinative.205 Yet as Anita Allen writes, “[i]f courts can
justify enforcing surrogacy contracts by appeal to intent, they can, by the same token, justify
enforcing betrothals, marital vows and other personal undertakings . . . .”206 For good reason, our
courts have abandoned this approach to family matters, as it had devasting and oppressive
consequences. Patricia Williams writes, “ . . . there are implicit issues of dignity, bodily integrity, and
public health in surrogacy arrangements. These issues defy and exceed the sphere of private
contract.”207 Yet when a court decides to enforce a surrogacy contract, they are in effect deciding
matters of child custody according to contract principles instead of family law principles.
In order to limit the applicability of commercial principles to such intimate family matters as
child custody, some commentators have suggested using the best interests of the child standard for
determining parentage in disputed surrogacy cases. For example, the dissent in Johnson v. Calvert took
this approach.208 However, as I will discuss later, this standard has major drawbacks for parents who
are economically or socially underprivileged.
Another approach would be to disallow specific performance as a remedy for surrogacy
contracts. This could apply to all parties, such that a surrogate could not be ordered to hand over a
203 See LINDA D. ELROD, CHILD CUSTODY PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 7:2 (1993) (“Natural parents have a
fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and control of their children which is constitutionally protected. The parental
preference rule mandates that parents are entitled to custody of their offspring unless shown to be unfit by clear and
convincing evidence.”).
204 Id. at § 4:1 (“When the custody dispute is between two natural or adoptive parents, married or not, all states
mandate that the judge place the physical residency and legal custody of the child according to the “best interests” of the
child.”).
205 For example, Judge Edward Panelli reasoned, “[t]he parties’ aim was to bring Mark’s and Crispina’s child into
the world, not for Mark and Crispina to donate a zygote to Anna. Crispina from the outset intended to be the child’s mother.
Although the gestative function Anna performed was necessary to bring about the child’s birth, it is safe to say that Anna
would not have been given the opportunity to gestate or deliver the child had she, prior to implantation of the zygote,
manifested her own intent to be the child’s mother. No reason appears why Anna’s later change of heart should vitiate the
determination that Crispina is the child’s natural mother.” Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782.
206 Allen, supra note 74, at 29.
207 Patricia Williams, Babies, Bodies and Buyers, 33 Cᴏʟᴜᴍʙɪᴀ Jᴏᴜʀɴᴀʟ ᴏғ Gᴇɴᴅᴇʀ ᴀɴᴅ Lᴀᴡ 14 (2016).
208 Johnson, 851 P.2d at 790 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
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child and the intended parents could not be ordered to take custody of a child. Alternatively, a
statutory scheme might make termination of parental rights a non-enforceable contract term. A
recent bill proposed in New York attempted to do this by including language that disallowed
enforcement of contract terms giving intended parents a “judgement of parentage” in cases where the
surrogate objected to the termination of her parental rights.209
3. Reproductive Justice
The Reproductive Justice movement’s emphasis on parental rights as part of reproductive
freedom provides another lens through which to see the importance of protecting parental rights. As
defined by the SisterSong collective, “Reproductive Justice [is] the human right to maintain personal
bodily autonomy, have children, not have children, and parent the children we have in safe and
sustainable communities.”210 The Reproductive Justice movement emerged out of Black women’s
dissatisfaction with the “Reproductive Rights” framework of mainstream feminism. With the
emphasis on abortion rights, the mainstream feminist movement elevated women’s choice to not be a
parent, while providing little attention to the corollary right to become a parent. “SisterSong affiliates
have broadened the conversation to recognize how race- and class-based histories of population
control, sterilization abuse, high-risk contraception, and the effects of environmental pollution on
fertility and maternal health have shaped the reproductive lives of third-world woman, (including
women of color in the first world).”211
Movement activists organized against laws and policies that amounted to official
reproductive abuse of people of color and their communities. Abuses included
coerced sterilization; welfare and fostering policies that punished poor women for
‘illegitimate’ motherhood. . . . [R]eproductive justice was born from the claims of
women of color that they had the right to be sexual persons and to be fertile. They
claimed the right to decide to become parents and the right to the resources they
needed to take care of their children.212
Thus the right to become a parent was always crucial to this movement, a right which may
have particular resonance given the U.S.’s history of commodification and selling enslaved women’s
children.213 Native populations and other people of color have also been subject to similar denials of
parental rights, from the assimilationist boarding schools that Native children were forced to attend,
the excessive out of community adoptions that motivated the passage of the Indian Child Welfare
209 S. 7717, 2019-2020 Legis. Sess., (N.Y. 2020), https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2019/s7717
[https://perma.cc/7DYW-BTJ2] (last visited May 14, 2020).
210 SisterSong Women of Color Reproductive Justice Collective, What is Reproductive Justice? SɪsᴛᴇʀSᴏɴɢ, https://
www.sistersong.net/reproductive-justice/ [https://perma.cc/9KMX-2AXS] (last visited May 14, 2020) (emphasis added).
211 Bailey, supra note 51, at 727.
212 LORETTA J. ROSS & RICKIE SOLINGER, REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE: AN INTRODUCTION 14 (2017). See also
Dorothy Roberts and Lisa Sangoi, Black Families Matter: How the Child Welfare System Punishes Poor Families of Color, Tʜᴇ Aᴘᴘᴇᴀʟ
(Mar. 26, 2018), https://theappeal.org/black-families-matter-how-the-child-welfare-system-punishes-poor-families-of-color-
33ad20e2882e/ [https://perma.cc/Z2UF-Q9NU] (last visited Apr. 8, 2021).




Act, to the family separation border policy of the Trump administration. Given this context, it seems
particularly important to protect the parental rights of all gestators, especially in situations where
society and courts may not see the gestator as the most rightful or desirable parent. Surrogacy is one
such situation.
4. Black Feminism
This concern for setting policy with the most vulnerable in mind is influenced by the
famous Combahee River Collective Statement. In it, the Collective argued that the multiple
“interlocking” systems of oppression that Black women face means that Black women’s struggle can
help identify the revolutionary strategy that will liberate everyone. They wrote, “If Black women were
free, it would mean that everyone else would have to be free since our freedom would necessitate the
destruction of all the systems of oppression.”214
In applying this concept to surrogacy, we can see the problems with using the best interests
of the child standard for determining custody in disputed surrogacy cases. The race and class biases of
judges can all too easily influence their determination of what is in the child’s best interests. Given
that we know that intended parents are mostly white and invariably will be wealthier than a surrogate
they hire, using the best interests of the child standard would be very unlikely to award custody to
surrogates in all but the most extreme cases. For these reasons, ensuring that parental rights are not
waivable by contract is the policy option that would best protect working-class women of color and,
in so doing, would best protect the rights of all women working as surrogates.
5. Limiting Commodification by Giving Workers Power
Giving surrogates the right to back out of contracts will also have the effect of making
surrogacy riskier and more expensive for intended parents. This might make it less popular, and the
industry could decline as its profits suffer. If commercial surrogacy were less common, this would
mean a reduction in the commodification of babies and women’s reproductive labor. As I have
argued, this would be a good thing from a social justice perspective.
B. Altruistic surrogacy – exploitation in disguise?
Since surrogacy’s outset, some feminists have argued that altruistic surrogacy is more
exploitative than commercial surrogacy, because at least commercial surrogates are paid for their
labor. Lori Andrews argued that without legal commercial surrogacy, “infertile couples will only be
able to have a child through this arrangement by pressuring friends or relatives into being a
surrogate.”215 A similar concern has been raised in relation to India’s 2016 ban on commercial
surrogacy, which specifically exempted altruistic surrogacy performed by female family members.
Critics have suggested that exempting such familial altruistic surrogacy from censure assumes that the
family itself is not also a site of exploitation and coercion.216 Some women who became altruistic
214 COMBAHEE RIVER COLLECTIVE, THE COMBAHEE RIVER COLLECTIVE STATEMENT (1977) http://circuitous
.org/scraps/combahee.html [https://perma.cc/BW3J-NJGR] (last visited May 14, 2020).
215 Andrews, supra note 146, at 2365-66.
216 See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 47, at 115-16 (“[A]ssisted reproduction’s track record in human rights violations is
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,
24 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 3 (2021)
482
surrogates for family members have reported bad experiences, and nasty intrafamilial disputes have
resulted.217 So how serious is the risk of coerced altruistic surrogacy, and what relationship does it
have to banning commercial surrogacy?
First, from a Marxist perspective, it should be clear that substituting the complex intimacies
of the family with the “simple” arms-length transactions of the market does not end exploitation or
coercion. Instead, the deeply personal nature of such labor under capitalism becomes erased by liberal
market ideology, which posits everyone as disembodied utility-maximizers interacting according to
simple mathematical rules. In addition, I would argue that it may be hard to distinguish the relative
frequency of pain and discord associated with commercial as compared to altruistic surrogacy given
the way each conforms to socially preconceived ideas. Because workers under capitalism do not
generally have a right to the product of their labor, to the extent that commercial surrogates are
viewed by themselves and others to be workers, they are less likely to see the worker having a claim
upon the resulting child. Because unpaid gestators do generally have a right to parent the children they
gestate for their families, it seems likely that people are more able to see the legitimate but competing
claims to parenthood involved when a conflict arises between surrogates and intended parents who
are family members.
The frequency of coerced intrafamilial altruistic surrogacy is a matter for empirical research
beyond the scope of this paper. However, there is no evidence that this has become a widespread
problem in U.S. states that have banned commercial surrogacy. It is certainly hard to imagine that
altruistic surrogacy would ever take place on the scale of commercial surrogacy, given that only the
latter is supported by corporate investment. When India legalized surrogacy in 2002, it only took
approximately a decade for it to become the global “mother destination” for the industry.218 Having
invested capital in their businesses, it is not surprising that some doctors have been trying find ways
to skirt the new ban, for example by implanting embryos in women at their clinics in India but
sending them to Nepal or Kenya to give birth.219 These are complex situations, and we should not
expect to find a perfect policy solution. However, I would suggest that these experiences should
hazard against legalizing commercial surrogacy in the first place. Like any capitalist industry, it is
harder to shut it down than to not develop it in the first place.
The popular narrative of altruistic surrogacy as a laudable example of selfless giving should
certainly be complicated, especially given the way that such narratives can reinforce gendered
stereotypes of women as naturally nurturing, etc.220 Furthermore, altruistic surrogacy certainly
provides no ready “solution” for the many people who might like a child produced through surrogacy
dwarfed . . . by the track record of the ‘natural family.”); Rudrappa, supra note 193, at 90 (“[F]amilies are never quite safe
havens from the corrupting forces of the market; instead, they are sites that perpetuate gender subordination. By posing
altruistic surrogacy within kin networks as the path to women’s welfare, the State re-inscribes an idealized concept of the
traditional heterosexual family. . . .”).
217 NEW YORK TASKFORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, supra note 7, at 23. See, e.g., Ted Sherman, N.J. Gay Couple
Fight for Custody of Twin 5-Year-Old Girls, NJ.ᴄᴏᴍ, Dec. 20, 2011, https://perma.cc/W47Z-ABYD (last updated Mar. 30, 2019).
For a full discussion of this issue, see American Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM), Using Family Members as Gamete
Donors or Surrogates, 107 Fᴇʀᴛɪʟɪᴛʏ ᴀɴᴅ Sᴛᴇʀɪʟɪᴛʏ 1136, 1139-40 (2017) (discussing the potential for emotional harm to donors
and surrogates).
218 RUDDRAPPA, supra note 25, at 5.
219 Ruddrappa, supra note 193, at 81-82.




but who don’t have a friend or family member they can convince to do the work without pay.
Instead, we should recognize that just like any other intimate relationship, altruistic surrogacy arrangements
can be fraught and disappointing. Nor should we expect it to be free of coercion along the lines of
gender and power. In my next section I will discuss the types of policy regime that I believe would
best help fight these forms of exploitation and oppression.
C. A public policy based on reproductive justice is inconsistent with commercial surrogacy
As explained above, the reproductive justice movement emphasizes true freedom of choice
for working class people, especially people of color, which can only be realized through material
support and a caring community. Such a policy framework would be beneficial to all people, but its
expansive inclusivity would require abandoning liberal individualism for a more collective ideal.
Dorothy Roberts writes,
We would all benefit from a health policy that redirected billions of dollars
currently spent on fertility treatment towards eradicating the causes of infertility.
We would all benefit from a view of family that valued loving relationships,
however created, rather than genes traded on the market. We would all benefit
from a work world that appreciated mothers’ care for children. Once again,
America’s unwillingness to attend to the needs of Black citizens stymies the
potential for widespread change that would enrich everyone’s life.221
A policy regime based upon reproductive justice would require expanding substantive
freedoms for all people, not just those with enough privilege to access expensive technologies and
services. It would also mean expanding the freedom to not have to become a surrogate due to a need for
money. It would mean finally having a true reckoning with the racism that has been core to this
country from the start, and which today wreaks havoc on Black families through medical neglect,
racist child welfare policies, and police violence.
Commercial surrogacy will always be in conflict with this agenda because as a capitalist
business, it seeks to make money rather than promote the social good. It needs workers to exploit,
and it will promote its product regardless of whether that product is good for workers or society. The
product that it sells are children who are genetically related to the purchaser and/or who have genetic
material chosen for various attributes that are desirable to their wealthy, white clientele. In doing so,
the industry perpetuates deeply racist, classist, and sexist notions about whose genetic material is
worth reproducing, whose children are worth millions of dollars to create, and whose children are
worth the bodily labor and pain of strangers. In other words, it expresses a normative value about
whose lives matter. The question, then, is whether our laws should endorse this view. As Patricia
Williams writes, “If having children is reduced to a cipher for the projected vanities of self-centered
reproductive consumers, then we have turned the enterprise of parenting into that of narcissism.”222
We perhaps cannot help that the desire for genetically related children is a strong one with a
long cultural history.223 Yet there is no reason that public policy, such as legalizing commercial
221 ROBERTS, supra note 151, at 292.
222 Williams, supra note 207, at 15.
223 See ROBERTS, supra note 151, at 264-69.
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surrogacy, should encourage such a conception of family. Williams writes, “ . . . the exciting new
technologies of creating and sustaining life should not blind us to the multiple ways we might
otherwise make family, particularly if we relinquish the conceit that all our children must ‘look like
us.’”224 Good public policy would work to foster a diverse vision of family that is less dependent on
genetics. It would also support working class families through free childcare, better quality public
education, and culturally sensitive supportive services replacing the racist and punitive child welfare
system. Quality socialized medicine would address many common causes of infertility, while paid
family leave would reduce pressures on women to delay childbearing. Reproductive technology such
as IVF could be free for people’s personal use as part of socialized healthcare. Barriers to adoption
for LGBTQ couples and others who do not fit the white, nuclear, heteronormative family mold
should be removed. Perhaps new models for raising children, such as non-romantic partnerships,
could also be facilitated through changes to family law. Non-enforceable altruistic surrogacy
agreements could potentially be a part of this diverse ecosystem of reproduction, enacting family
formation as a type of mutual aid.
In conclusion, activists and policymakers should work to create a public health and family
policy that fosters the type of world we want to build. This world is inclusive, decommodified, and in
which labor and love have priority over genetics and money. A reproductive justice policy agenda
would have many facets, but commercial surrogacy would not be one of them.
224 Williams, supra note 207, at 15.
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